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From Real to Reeh E ntangled in Nonfiction Fil m 
Noel Carroll 
I. lutroductiou 
Over the past twenty years, the nonfiction film has 
achieved a level of prestige and pramtnence unequaled in anv 
other period of its history. Yet, for all the recent ener�y, 
thought and discussion devoted to this enterprise, the non­
fiction film remains one of the most confused areas of film 
theory. Argumen�s of all kinds challenge the very idea of 
nonfiction film. The nonfiction filmmaker, it is observed, 
selects his or her 1Daterials, manipulates them, inevi­
tably has a point of view and, therefore, cannot pretend to 
offer us anything but a personal or subjective vision of 
things. Objectivity is impossible if only because the medium 
itself due to framing, focussing, editil\2 -- necessitates 
the inescapability of choice. Whether or not an 
event is sta�ed, the act of filmin� involves structuring so 
that what results is an interpretation rather than the Real. 
The problem, according to this subjectivi�y argument, is 
not simply that the film�ker can't jump out of his akin, one 
can't jump out of the film medium either. 
A related set of arguments. worries the distinction 
between fiction aud nonfiction. On the one hand, it is 
charged that the nonfiction film shares narrative, dra�tic 
and aesthetic devices, like parallel editin�, climaxes and 
contrastive editing, with fiction films and that, conse­
quently, it presents its subjects fictionally.I Or, in 
a variation on the strategy behind the subjectivity ar�ument, 
it is proposed that filmmakers are trapped within ideolo�y, 
both in their fonns and contents; that the posture of 
objectivity itself is a pose, indeed sn ideologically motivated 
one; at� that documentaries belong to the genus of social 
fiction. Some commentators go so far as to suppose that because 
any cultural event, photographed or not, is structured (ac­
cording to roles and folkways), recording one merely 
captures the ideological Mfictiona� of a given 
time, place and people.2 Perhaps the most extreme denial of 
the boundary between fiction and nonfiction film �as been 
voiced by Christian ffetz -- he suggests that all films are 
fiction <purportedly) because they are representations, i.e., 
because, for e��mple, the train �ou see on the screen is, not 
literally in the screenin� room. 
To further complicate matters, there is a minority opinion 
that has it that all fiction films are actuallly documen­
taries;4 .casablanca is about Humphrey 8ogart in front of a 
camera as well as being an archaeological fragment of American 
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mores and styles of the early forties. In fact, at least one 
theorist, a proponent of Jacques Derrida's notion of 
differance, advances the nonficrion-ts-really-fictton 
ap proach while simultaneous!� insisting that fiction films 
are docuaientariee.5 
The central concepts as employed in many of these argu1Ents 
-- including objectivity, subjectivity, fiction, document � 
are fraught with ambiguities and <lownright misc onceptions. But 
before examining these problems critically, it is worthwhile 
to speculat,e about the way in which, historically, the 
discussion of nonfiction film reached its present state. 
I think that the 1a0st important influence on the way that 
nonfiction fil• is currently conceptualized was the development 
of direct 1cinellll8 Csomet1iaes called cinema verite} in the 
sixties. The movement -- associated with the work of Robert 
Drew, the Haysles Brothers, D.A. Pennebaker, Richard Leacock, 
Frederick ·wise'll!n, Allan King, Chris Marker and others -
proposed a new style of docusuentary filmmaking that repud.iated 
prevailing approaches to the nonfiction film. These 
filmmakers escheved, a1D0ng other things, the use of scripts, 
voice-of-God narration, re-enactments of events, and staging 
and direction of any sort. They employed new, light­
weight cameras and sound equipment in order to 1mmerse 
themselves in events, to observe rather than to influence, to 
catch life on the wing. Many of the aims of direct 
cine-a parallel the avowed objectives of the species of 
cinematic realism sponsored by Andre Bazin. Techniques and 
approaches were adopted that encouraged the spectator to 
think for himself, to take an active role toward the screen, 
to evolve his own interpretation of what was significant in 
the imagery rather than have the filmmaker interpret it for 
him. The new spontaneity of the filmmaker and spectator 
correlated expressively with soiae sort of new MfreedomM in 
contradistinction to the ftauthoritarianism� of traditional 
doculDl!ntaries. Often the new style was promoted as an 
epistemological breakthrough for cineu. Cr! tics concerned 
with and, at times, participants in the direct cinema movement 
spoke as if the new techniques guaranteed the filmic re­
presentation of reality. 
Of course, previous documentary filmmakers, such as John 
Grierson6 and Dziga Vertov,7 had never denied that they were 
involved in interpreting their subject matter. But for 
advocates of direct cinema, at their most polemical, that 
alle(iance to interpretation, to telling the audience to 
think, violated their conception of what it is to be a docu­
mentary. As a result, upholders of direct cinema evolved a 
etyle designed to 11'.inimize the types of control exerted in 
the older styles of nonfiction film. 
But no sooner was the idea of cinet'IMl verit' abroad 
than critics and viewers turned the polemics of direct cinema 
against direct cineaa. A predictable tu quogue would note 
all the ways that direct cine� was inextricably involved 
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with interpreting its eaterials. Direct cineT1S& o�ened a can of 
worms and then got eaten by them. Almost concomitantly, a 
similar, and, in fact, related debate eroerged in the so'C!ewhat 
narrow discussion of e�hno�raphic f 1lm. Anthropologists who 
opted for filming in order to avoid the subjectivity of 
their field notes quickly found themselves confronted by 
arguments about selection, manipulation and eventually, by 
arguments about the inescapability of ideology. In regard 
to the anthropol ogical debate especially, but also in regard to 
direct cinema, it was stressed that the very act of 
filming changed or was highly likely to influence the outcome 
of the events recorded. ln order to grapple with both the 
arguments from subjectivitv and related argu�nts about 
camera intrusiveness, some filmmakers, like Jean Rouch and 
Edgar Morin in Chronigue d•un Ete, included themselves in their 
work, acknowledging their participation , their manipulation 
and their intervention. In �eneral, filmmakers and 
proponents of direct cinema now guard their claims. They 
have become the first to admit that they have a 
point of view, maintaining only that they are presenting 
their "'subjective reality,.. i.e., their personal vision of 
reality as they see it. For example, Frederick 
Wiseman merely insists on the veracity of an honest, 
f iret-person statement for hie work when he says ·The 
objective-subjective argument is from my view, at least 
in film ten1e, a lot of nonsense. The films are my 
response to a certain experienoe.·8 
With the rise of direct cinecaa, two major wrinkles were 
added to the dialogue concerning the nonfiction film. First, 
direct ctnema repudiated large parte of the tradition of 
nonfiction film because it was interpretive. Then, like a 
boomerang, the dialectic snapped back; direct cinema, it was 
alleged, was also interpretive and, a fortiori, subjective 
rather than objective (and, for some, fiction rather than 
nonfiction). The combined force of these maneuvers within the 
debate was to stigmati�e all nonfiction film, both the 
traditional and direct cinema varieties, as subjective. Thus, 
we find Erik larnotJW concluding hie history of documentary 
files with' remarks such as these: 
.. 
To be sure, some documentarists claim to be 
objective--a tetin that seems to renounce an inter­
pretive role. The clai1' may be strate�ic, but 1.t 
is surely meaningless. The documentariet, like any 
communicator in any medium, makes endless choices. 
Re selects topics, people, vistas, angles, lene, 
juxtapositions, sounds, words. Each selection is 
an e�preesion of hie point of view, whether he is 
aware of it or not, whether he acknowledges it or 
not. 
Even behind the first step, selection of a topic, 
there is a 'llOtive. 
4
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• • •  It is in selecting and arranging hie findings 
that he expreeaea hiaself i these choices are, in 
effect, commenta. Ancf whether he adopts the stance 
of observer, or chronicler or whatever, he cannot 
escape his subjectivity. He presents hie version of 
the world.9 
Hore quotations could be added to Barnouw'a, which repre­
sents one of the more or leas standard vaya of coming to ter11S 
vith the polellica and rhetorical framework engendered by direct 
cinema.IO But that Barnouv'a position rebounds so naturally 
froa the direct cinema debate is part of the proble� vith 
it, because, aa I hope to ahow in the next section. the pre­
auppoaitiona. of that diacuaaion are irreparably flawed. 
II. •on.fiction Fil .. Ain't 8eceaaarily So 
A. Nonfiction Fil• and objectivity 
Though many of the preceding arguments appear to be de­
signed to deal with issues ac>ecific to the nonfiction film, a 
moment'• deliberation shove that they are far more gen­
erally devastating in their scope. The possibility of objec­
tivity in the nonfiction film is denied because such films in­
volve selection, emphasis, manipulaton of materials, 
interpretation and points of view. In fact, these features 
lead commentators not only to withhold the possibility of 
objectivity from nonfiction film; they also prompt 
c°"mentators to reclassify such filCDS as subjective. Yet, if 
these arguments have any force, they vill not simply demolish 
the subjective/objective distinction in regard to non­
ffction film; the lectures and texts of history and science 
vill be their victi�a as vell. 
Historians, for example, are characteristically concerned 
with making interpretations, presenting points of viev 
about the past, aelectinR certain events for consideration 
rather than others, •nd emphasizing some of the selected 
events and their interconnections. That's just what doing 
history ta. Thus, if the nonfiction fil• ta subjective, 
for the •hove re•aomJ, then eo is historical writing. 
Nor 11 •clence unscathed. It ta hard to i .. �ine· an e�per­
iment without .. ntpulation and sel ection , or • theory without 
emph .. ia and interpretation. In short, the argument• against 
objectivity in nonfiction film are too powerful, unle.se their 
proponents •re prepared to embrace a rather thoroughgoing 
•kepticiam about the proepecta of objectivity in general. 
The defense of such a far-ranging skeptical position would, 
of course, have to be joined on the battlefields of epistem­
ology rather than in the trenches of film theory. Indeed, 
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if such a skeptical position were defensible, the reclassi­
fication of the nonf icton film as subjective would simply be 
a footnote to a larger ca�paign. 1 mention this because 1 do 
not think that commentators who conclude that the nonfiction 
fila is subjective intend their remarks as a mere gloss 
on the notion that evetYthing ts subjective. But that, I fear, 
ts the untoward implication of their line of attack. 
At the same time, another danger in collapsing the dis­
tinction between the subjective and objective is that we will 
still· have to distiTiguish between different kinds of en­
deavors -- in film, for example, between Frederick Wiseman'& 
Hoep·ital and Maya Deren's intentionally personal At Land -
even if they are all said to be under the enveloping bubble of 
subjectivity. But how will these boundaries be drawn? 
Moet probably by reinatating something very .. uch like the 
subjective/objective distinction. Perhaps Wisefl\Bnts film 
would be called ·subject! ve-object ive • in contradt sti nc­
t ion to Deren's "subjective-subjective.· But two points 
need to be made here. First, the nonitaltcized ·subjective" 
and ·objective" represent the basic concepts which are 
indispensable in this particular context of classifica­
tion; 1f they are momentarily d1sm1ssed, they must inexorably 
return; and this provides a good reason not to d1s�1ss them 
in the first place. Second, the italicized ·aubjecttve­
is conceptually lazy; it does no work, and it serves little 
purpose. It ts all-inclusive, so lamentably, it ts 
not exclusive. For if there is no italicized ·ob.1ec­
tive" to counterpose against it, the italicized �subjective" 
ia trivial. It ts a piece of excess theoretical 
baggage, easily disposable because it says nothing 
more than the obvious, namely, that all research and communi­
cation ts 1Un-made. But more on this later. 
As an initial response to Tff1 opening objections, a 
subjectivist vts-a-vts the nonfiction film might try to 
argue that there is so mething special about film that makes 
i t  inevitably subjective in a way that history and science 
are not. Thus, when it is said that Hospital is ·aubJective­
objective, • the italicized ·subjective· ts being meaning­
fully contrasted to the objectivity of the texts and lec­
tures of history and science. But what is that ·some­
thing special?• One of the candidates is the notion that 
every shot in a nonfiction film perforce involves a per­
sonal viewpoint or point-of-view whether the filmmaker ts 
aware of 1t or not; in other words, a life history of atti­
tudes, feelings and beliefs determine where the camera 
is positioned and aimed, what lens is chosen and how it ts 
set. Consequently, all film, including the nonfiction film, 
6
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ia neceaaarily personal, ·subjective,· in a way that 
historical and scientific writing ia not. That ia. each 
i .. �e ia indelibly imprinted vith the fil1tmaker'e (or 
fil ... kere') personality vhereae there are certain protocols 
and stylistic canons of exposition in history and science that 
enable practitioners of those disciplines to subdue if not 
totally efface their personalities. 
Bela Balazs, for one, aeeas to hold a position on 
compoaition in the single shot (vhich he calla the set-up) that 
ie like the above, proposing that a representational iaage 
can't be .ade vithout conveying a viewpoint that ie eelf­
expreeeive of the fil..aker. He vritee. concerning fiction and 
nonfiction fila alike, that 
!veTy vork of art must present not only objective 
reality but the subjective personality of the artist, 
and this personality includes hie way of looking at 
things, hie ideology and the liadtati�ns of the 
period. All this ie projected into the picture, even 
unintentionally. !very picture shove not only a piece 
of reality but a point of view aa well. The set-up 
of the camera betrays the inner attitude of the man 
behind the camera . 1 1  
For Balazs, 
unavoidable 
• 
reaaona. 
a personal point of view in every ahot ie 
But vill this vaeh? l suspect not, for several 
To begin, the idea of point-of-vi ew in fil• ia really a 
bundle of ideas, tthich are often literally unrelated. 
•Point-of-view· can refer to a speci fic kind of editing echeaa 
(a character looks off screen, there ta a cut to vhat he 
eeea, and then there ta a cut back to the character); it 
can refer to the position of the ca.era (the camer�'• 
viewpoint, or point-of-view, or perspective); or it can refer 
to the narrator'• and/or the authorial point of vtev or 
both -- t. e. 1 to the perspective of a character commenting on 
event• in the f ila and/or to the implied perspective of 
the film t,ovard said events - or 1 t can refer to the 
creator's personal point-of-vtev. Undoubtedly there are ehote 
in which all five concepts of point-of-view can be 
applied atmultaneoualy; John Wayne'• Green Berets would 
probably be a good place to aearch for e�"Plea. Never­
theless, these concepts are quite discrete. And this 
eugpata that at the heart of the position -- that a ehot ie, 
eo ip•o, a point-of-view -- liee the fallacy of equivocation. 
It ie t�ue that each rapreeentational ahot, eave those vhere 
the t .. ge ia drawn on the f ila, haa a point-of-view or a view­
point or a perspective in the aense that the ca•ra muat be 
pla ced aomevhere. Thie llight be tbou�ht of ae the literal 
meaning of the cineaatic point-of-viev, i.e., the ca198ra ' e 
vantage point . A pen:onal point-of-view ia yet aaother 11atter; 
7
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indeed, calling it a "point-of-viev" i s  at root metaphorical, 
using the language of physical position to characterize the 
values and feelings of the film's creator toward the subject 
de picted. Proponents of the omnivorous point-of-viev school 
conflate tvo separate ideas, fallaciously moving from the 
necessity of a camera viewpoint in each shot to the neces­
sity of a personal viewpoint, suppressing the fact that the two 
phenomena, though bearing the same name• are distinct. 
The debate, of course, does not end here. Rather, the 
charge of equivocation can be met with the claim that the tvo 
senses of point-of-view really are the same because the 
personal point of view determines the camera's viev(ing) point 
in such a way that the resulting l.a�e is invariably and 
reliably symptomatic of the creator's underlying vie�point. 
The viewing point inevitably betrays the personal viewpoint 
and, hence, is alvays revelatory. But this, it seems to 
me ,  is implausible. Cameras can be turned on accidentally, and 
their operators can leave the� running without reali%ing it, 
thereby recording events upon which the creator has no oppor­
tunity to inscribe his personal viewpoint. Likewise, unex­
pected events can intrude into the vi ewfinder e.g., Lee 
Harvey Oswald's assassination -- before there is time for a 
personal vie�point to crystali%e, that is, unless ve wish to 
ascribe lightning omn1sc1ence to the cameraperson1s uncon­
scious. Camera positions can also be determined by circum­
st.ances, like a police barricade, and a cameraperson pressed 
�or ticte can shoot "wild," hoping to "get somethin�" without 
having any idea about or attitude toward vhat is happening. 
One could attempt to assimilate these cases by means of a 
rather extreme psycholo�ical theory, arguing that vhen shoo,ing 
wild the cameraperson is in something akin to a. trance, uncon­
sciously selecting and expressively framing exactly the details 
that accord with subterranean interests. However, this sounds 
ad hoc. imbuing the unconscious not only with a kind of omni­
scieace but also of omnipotence. Freud i s  clearly correct in 
saying that !E!!. apparently random gestures reveal hidden 
motives. wtshea and attitudes. but no one has ahovn that all 
gestures are meaningful aignala of the psychopathology of 
everyday life. It seems to me an indisputable fact that a 
cattteraperaon can set up and move cameras with random attention 
-- precisely like a remote-control video monitor in a baok 
and that the result need not develop into a coherent personal 
viewpoint. In re�ard t o  adverse circueetances, like constrain­
ing police barricades, it aight be argued that the ea11era­
peraon will always take up the position, out of all the a v ail­
able ones under the circumstancaa. that beat suite his personal 
point-of-view. This -- like the "trance" solution to wwild 
shooting" -- ia ad hoc. In both cases, what are ve to 11ake of 
complaints that the reeulta of shooting were not what the cam­
eraper&on vented or needed? One &!�ht aay that they got what 
they really v•nted (without knowing it). but one aaya this at 
the coat of .. king the original hypothesis auspiciously unf al­
aif iable. Needless to aay. a filmmaker could successfully 
attempt to .ake either a fiction or nonfiction film in which 8
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f!!Very ehot ca.amtcated a �raonal attitude. Bue it effronta 
credulity to purport that every ehot in every film ta necea­
earily of thia Yariety. 
Another problea vtth the set-up • personal vteton approach 
1• that of ten the ·creator· of the film ta neither the ca�ra­
peraon nor the edt�or: ao vhoae peraonal viaton te being 
conveyed? And, more importantly, in both fiction and non­
fiction fil•, directors and vrttera are typically aeatgned 
preordained pointe-of-vicv. Can't an atheiat ahoot and cut 
a reverential life of Chrtat, and can't a Blakean .. ke an 
industrial f tlm about computer technology without a 
gli..er of repugnance in any of the ahote? r11 ... kers, 
that ta, can not only not have an attitude toward their 
aeatgn.ent, but even if they have an attitude, it ca� be 
e�c:eaafully repre11ed. There ta a ehot tn Kineatca where the 
ca•raun1 according to the comaentator, perhaps out of 
1 ngrained m>deaty, pull• �•Y from the acene of a aan -king a 
paaa at a vot11an. But thia ta neither evidence that ell 
abota are under auch guidance nor that the caGera-n, con­
trary to hie ordinary diapoattton, could not undeTtake a 
documentary film ude up excluatvely of aquarely centered 
ahota of public attempts at seduction. Perhape it vtll be pro­
poaed that in the latter case a trace of disapproval or irony 
vtll alvaye be vtatble, there to be unearthed by a complex 
exegeata. But auch exerctaea in interpretation .. Y actually be 
no eore then face aavtag. The poatttontn« of a ahot ta juat 
not 88 tndtcattve of a filmmaker'• authentic point-of-view aa 
aome f tlm theoriata let on. 
Lastlv, even if the ahot • a personal vtaton approach 
vere true, it vould pertain only to ehota and not to films in 
their entirety. A theorist vho movea from the putative fact 
that every ahot in a given nonfiction film represents a 
peraonal point-of-view to the conclusion that every nonfictJon 
f tlm is a peraonal vtaton com111.ts the fallacy of composition. 
For even if each ahot vere personally inscribed vith a 
dectaton that fuaed the valuea and attitudes of a lifetit!le, 
such ahota could be asaembled and combined vith each other 
and vtth co•me ntary in vaya that neutralize the attitudes 
inherent in the atngle ahota. Hoet compilation films 
demonatrate that the auppoaedly tntrtneic personal pointa-of­
vtev in original individual ahota don't add up to the point­
of-viev of the entire film that they inhabit. ?or example, 
The Pall of the l.omanov Dynasty has no difficulty turning 
whatever poettive eenti�nts czar�•t camera .. n '•ight have 
expre11ed tn their footage of the royal family into cri­
�tcta• of the monarchy, crtttctem that doea not eeem deacrtb­
able aa aubjecttve. 
The argu .. nt that nonfiction f tlm is aubjective htngea not 
only on confuatona about the concept(a) of point-of-view but 
alao about the concepts of eubjecttvtty and objectivity. The 
charge of aubjectivity, ae leveled at the nonfiction film, 
appea1'9 to mean one of tvo1 often elided, thinga: ftret1 that 
9
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a film is personal, o r  stamped �1th a personal vievpoint; and 
second. that a ftl� is not objective. When considering the 
first meaning of subjectivity. ve muat ask vhether the vay in 
which a film is said to be personal is problematic to the 
status of nonfiction film as objective as vell as whether 
nonfiction films are personal in a vay that distinguishes them 
from nonfiction writing. 
lf by ,aying the nonfiction film is personal we mean that 
any assertions or iMplied statements eade by such films are 
episteaolo�ically on a par vith statements like ·1 believe that 
x,· than ve vould be tempted to reclassify the nonfiction film 
;s subjective in 'the sense that its assertions and implied 
statements are only to be evaluated as honest or dishonest. 
But the mere fact that selection and interpretation are in­
volved in a nonfiction film does not entail the first person 
status of its clail&B � no more than those features suggest 
that all historical vriting is subjective. We have inter­
subjective criteria for evaluating the selections and inter­
pretations in both cases. 
Undoubtedly because film is a visual medium, C011'11entators 
are enticed {incorrectly) into identifying the imagery (and 
even its flov) as a simulacrum or reproduction of vhat its 
filmmaker aav; and they jump from this to the proposition that 
"That'a how the filmmaker sav it• (vhere seeing ts nonveridical 
and.involuntary), vhich, in turn, is regarded as something 
indisputable and subjective. They also seem to treat shots as 
·a sort of celluloid sense data. Thia playa into the confusions 
over the point-of-vtev of the shot and personal vision. As a 
result the filmmaker is left in a doxastic cocoon. !ut there 
is no reason to conceive of shots in film as celluloid sense 
data -- either passively received or as unavoidable results of 
unconscious structuring -- nor does the camera's point of viev 
necessarily have to correspond to a personal vision . The 
confusion rests vith comprehending photography as nonveridical 
vision and the camera as an eye -- vtth the result that each 
st�t is to be prefaced vith "I see". Though a nonfiction 
filmmaker might adopt this metaphor consider lrakhage's 
The Act of Seeing With One's Own Eyes films are not typi-
cally made under this rubric nor are they presented in vays 
that necessitate the ca�ra-eye {I) metaphor in order to be 
understood. The Act of Seeing With One's Own !yes ta an 
astonishing film in part because the camera strains fdr some 
sort of equivalence vith the filmmaker'& perception. Such a 
film may lead us to apeak of lyric-nonfiction; but it does 
not force us to say that all nonfiction films are subjective. 
In moat cases, I believe, certain misconceptions about the 
photographic component in film supply the primary grounds 
for convincing aome that nonfiction film ta problematically 
personal in a vay that verbal exposition in history and science 
i s  not. These notions arise (mistakenly) by equating the 
camera to nonveridical, involuntary perception. Without these 
presuppositions � camera point-of-viev - personal vision, and 
10
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ehooting • seeing � ve are left vith elements like editing. 
n1rr1tion •Dd com•ntary aa the possible sources of the puta­
tive apeci•l aubject1v1cy of fit.. Yet, the •elect1v1ty and in­
tet�retation itNolved in the•e proceaeee aee• no different and 
no .,re aubject1ve than the practice• of nonfiction vr1tera, 
since ve c•n ch1llenge the aelectio118, exclusion• and interpre­
tatio118 of nonfiction f 11 ... kera by .. ans of the ••me consider­
atio118 that we uae to evaluate the nonfiction writer. 
For ex11aple, in The La Cu1rdia Story, • 01vid Wolper 
production for hie TY aerie. Biography, the Little 1lawer'a 
f 11"9t election aa Mayor of Nev York ia presented solely aa a 
conaequence of hie attack on the corruption of T .... ny Ball. 
On the b&aia of the tnfon.tion on the acreen. the i•plied 
interpretation ta that the people of M� York, eppalled by the 
perversion of the A.erican ayate•, carried their indignation to 
the polls •nd averthr� the boaaea. But this interpretation 
e•cludea a key factor in La Guardia'• election - one that 
doean't accord nicely vith the civic• leaaon idealtaa of 
Wolper'• account: namely, La Guardia'• victory via an i•portant 
part of an ethnic conflict be tween Jeva and Italians, on the 
one hind, and the lrtah. on the other, for political, aocial 
and economic pover in Nev York; in other vorda, .any voted for 
La Guardia out of ethnic aelf-intereat. We are not compelled 
to accept the roster version of La Guardia•• election aa 
indisputably Wolper'• pereonel vision and leave it at that. We 
can alao ascertain the objective veakneaa of the interpreta­
tion on the baaia of interaubjectively available f1cta 1nd 
modes of reasoning of exactly the ••me sort that ve vould 
e•ploy vhen re1di� a scholarly journal or a aagazine •rticle. 
At tiniea, aome co�lm!ntetore 1ee• to argue th•t nonfiction 
film ia subjective not because aaid f tl .. are unavotd1bly 
peraon1l but hecau1e they are not objective. The l�ic here is 
that anything that 1a not objective •uat fall into the only 
other operative category; the subjective bec<>11ea the c.a1tchall 
for everything that doesn't auit the criteria o f  the objective. 
But vhat ia objectivity? In film debates, three notions seem 
to determine the course of the diacuaaion: Firat. ·objective· 
means •true·; second, ·objective• .eans ·representative of all 
or a t  le1at all the major � vievpointa on the aubject a t  
hand•; and third, ·objective· .eana ·having n o  viewpoint 
paraonal, political, theoretical, etc. -- vhataoever.· 
These three different concepts of objectivity do not fit 
together neatly, though in the course of an informal dtacuaaion 
after a nonf ictton fil• disputants 11ay slip vtlly-ntlly from 
one to another. The second concept of objectivity aounde eore 
like a political principle of tolerance -- •1et evet"Y voice be 
heerd· - then an epistemic criterion. And eave for caaea in 
vhich there ta only one uncontested and incontestable viewpoint, 
or those in vhich unavoidable indeterminacy rules (or those in 
vhich ve have ascended to the lofty poaition of Spinoza's god). 
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the conjunction of all perspectives on a given topic amounts to 
cacophony, and contradiction rather than truth. Moreover, the 
second and third aemea of "'objective," ae outlined above, are 
strictly incompatible vith each other. 
Nor does any one of these concepts of ·objectivity� appear 
viable tn aod of itself. Canvassing eve1y opinion on a subject 
aay exemplify some ideal of fairness but hiatoriana can be 
perfectly objective in their dtecueeione of 81�ler'e career 
without mentioning Heinrich fti•mler'a aaeeea111ent of the 
Fuhrer. The idea that objectivity coincides with presenting a 
topic from no perspective vhateoever rune afoul of objections 
from two different directions. Yirat, aaaumtng a liberal 
notion of a perspective, t t ta tmpoasi ble to conceive of a 
subject totally unstructured by any conceptual framework; there 
t s  no utterly •gtvenM; the unadorned facta are both �unadorned� 
11ld •f acta• relative to a conceptual acheaa or potnt-of-vtew. 
1 n other words, 1 t ta self-defeating for ue t.o deund that a 
nonfiction fil• be �untouched by human hands.· Second, in some 
f ielde a string of supposedly unadorned facta unayate1'Mltiied by 
a theory would be the paradigm of random, subjective observa­
tion. Thus, Lucien Goldman attacks Chronique d'un ft' exactly 
because it 11 un1nfon9ed by a theoretically baaed principle of 
aelectivity. 1 2 Finally, objectivity cannot be equivalent to 
truth. Such a requirement ie far too strong. The history of 
science ta littered with false theories which nonetheless vere 
objective. 1 can offer objective reasons -- perhaps baaed on 
atatiettce -- for the conjecture that there ta intelligent 
life on other planets and, nevertheless, it could turn out that 
we are alone in the universe. In such an tnatance, �y problem 
would be that 1 was wrong and not that I was overly subjective. 
Though objectivity ta not eQufvalent to truth, the two are 
related in an important way. In any given field of research or 
arguaent, there are patterns of reasoning, routines for asaee­
atng evidence, means of veighing the comparative ai�nificance 
of different types of evidence, and standards for observations. 
e:xperimentation and for the use of primary and secondary 
sources that are shared by practitioners in that field. 
Abiding by these established practices ie, at any given time, 
believed to be the beat aethod for getting at the truth. With 
continued research, these practices undergo changes for 
exa�ple, after Mani: economic evidence became ftlOre important in 
the study of history than it had been previously. Yet, even 
while aome practices are being revised, others are still 
shared. Thus, in virtue of their shared practices, researchers 
still have a cOllUIOn ground for debating and for appreciating 
the .rork of their peers. We call •piece of research objective 
in light of ita adherence to the practices of reasoning and 
evidence gathering in a given field. It te objective because 
i t  can be interaubjectively evaluated against standards of 
atgumerit and evidence shared by practitioners of a apectfic 
arena of discourse. 
With this in mlnd, ve can untangle some of the conceptual 
knots that tether the nonfiction ftla. The nonfiction film 
12
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ie not necessarily subjective; like nonfiction vriting, it is 
objecti�e when it abides by the norias of reaaonin� and stand­
ards of evidence of the areas about vhich it purports to iapart 
information. This is not to say that a nonfiction film is one 
that alvays abides by said standards; that would be tantat10unt 
to proposinsc that the nonfiction film is necessarily objective. 
Rather, ve should say that a nonfiction film is, at least, one 
that must be assessed agains.t the nonM of objecti�fty that are 
practiced in regard to the type of inforiaation the film pre­
sents to its spectators. Soee 1'aY feel that this is not a �ery 
helpful definition; how will we picK out the nonfiction filas 
from the fictions, on the one hand, and the purely lyrical 
fil�s, on the otherr 
In defeOBe of .., partial definition, let me lead off by 
postulating that we can never tell Tll!rely by lookin� vhether or 
not a film is a piece of nonfiction. This is because any kind 
of technique or verbal assertion that is characteristic of a 
nonfiction ftla can be imitated by a fiction filmmaker -­
The Battle of Algiers and David Holzman's Diary are faGM>us 
examples of this. Both are fiction films but both imitate the 
look of docu11entartes for expressive purposes. In Battle 
of Algiers the documentary look helps to heighten the gravity 
of events and thereby stokes the vievers' outra�e at French 
c olonialism1. In David Holzman •s Diary, the doc umentary conceit 
underscorea the conteaporaneity and specificity of the subject 
the 110vie-crazy sixties in Nev York at a time vhen the 
distinction betveen film and life passionately blurred for 
many. A spectator might be confused and believe, for a 1n0.ent, 
that these films vere nonfiction. But, like a sentence, a film 
cannot be classified at a glance as fiction or nonflctioo. 
Rather, films are indexedl) by their creators, producers, 
distributors, etc. as belonging to certain categories. When a 
film is indexed as nonfiction then ve know that it is appro­
priate to aBsess it according to the standards of objectivity 
of the field of which it is an example. Different nonfiction 
films, of course, correlate to different sorts of nonfiction 
discourse -- nevspaper articles, nevspaper editorials, human 
interest stories, science textbooks, instruction manuals, 
anthropological field notes, psychological case studies, 
historical narratives, etc. "Nonfiction" is a term that ls used 
tn contradistinction to fiction but it would be a mistake to 
think it pertains only to one type of exposition. There are 
aany different areas of nonfiction -- each vith ita own meth­
odological routines -- and, therefore, there are a variety of 
types of nonfiction film, each beholden to the restraints 
employed in pro�essing the kind of inforwatlon the film pre­
sents. A nonfiction film can be mistaken; that is, it ain't 
necessarily so. Yet, such a film can still be objective 
insofar as its miatakea do not violate the standards of rea­
soning aod evidence that constitute objectivity for the area of 
nonfiction which it exemplifies. To be a nonfiction film means 
to be open to criticism and evaluation according to the stan-
13
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dards of objectivity for the type of infonmtion being pur­
veyed. Interpretation, selectivity, etc, are, therefore, appro­
priate insofar as they heed intersubjective standards. 
Where does this lead us? Does it imply -- as suggested by 
Rouch and Fernando Solanas and Octavio Getino that 
nonfiction films •ust not traffic in aesthetic effects? Not at 
all. Nelson Good183n1s philosophical writings are full of 
playful alliterations and puns, and Edvard Gibbon 1n the 
The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Eapire e�ploys 
semicolons to create very dramatic pauses within long 
sentences. Yet, despite these effects, neither Goodman nor 
Gibbon are writing fiction. Similarly, the elegant juxtapo­
sitions in Song of Ceylon and the .onumental compositions of 
The Plow That Broke The Plains do not disqualify those works 
from the order of nonfiction. Art is not the antithesis of 
nonfiction; a nonfiction fil1111Mker may be as artistic as he or 
she chooses as long as the processes of aesthetic elaboration 
do not interfere with the genre's commitment to the appropriate 
standards of research, exposition and argument. For example, a 
nonfiction fil�maker cannot invent new events or eliminate ones 
that actually occurred for the sake of securing an aesthetic 
effect where this falsifies history. Imagine a docurEntary 
called The Pearl Harbor Tragedy in which the filmmaker changes 
history a bit by havin� a PT boat with a broken radio racing to 
Hawaii just behind the approaching Japanese air fleet in order 
to warn of the impending assault. Undoubtedly with enough 
crisp parallel editing, this invented episode could produce a 
great deal of suspense. But I think that no matter how �uch 
suspense is achieved in this way, we would not accept the 
aesthetic effect as a justification for chan�in� history. A 
nonfiction filmmaker must be accountable to the facts and the 
prospect of hei�htened effects does not alter that account­
ability. This, of course, is a major difference between 
fiction and nonfiction. In fiction, the past can always be 
rearranged in order to enhance aesthetic effects; but, thou�h 
aesthetic effects are legitimate in nonfiction, accuracY cannot 
be suspended in the name of art. 
A nonfiction filmmaker is camaitted by the genre to 
conveying the literal facts, where "literalN is defined by the 
objective procedures of the field of discourse at hand. 
Another way of saying this ts that the nonfiction f tlmmaker 
makes refer,ence to segments of possible worlds, 14 albeit ones 
that, at tiqies, closely rese�ble the ectual world, 
Despite Vertov's caveats against stagin�, there is no 
reason why nonfiction filas cannot employ re-enactments -- like 
the postal sorting in Night Mail or even historical 
reconstructions of types of events from the past e.g., 
a ainuet in Bar<?Sue Dance -- or even reconstructions of a 
specific event -- e.g., the car robbery in Third Avenue: Only 
The Strong Survive. Likewise, re-enactments of the surrender 
at Appomatto�, the Scopes Monkey Trial, the repeal of 
Prohibition, etc, can all be accommodated within the framework 
14
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of the nonf1ct1on fil� as long as such reconstructions are as 
accurate as possible given the state of available evidence. 
This raises qYe6t1on6 about the boundary line between non­
fiction and some historical fiction, especially cases like 
The Rise To Power of Louis XIV. In this film, great pains were 
taken to insure the authenticity of detail as vell as using 
actual memoirs and written docuraents of the period as a basis 
for dialogue. Yet, The Rise to P°"'er of Louis XIV is still 
fiction because 1ts creator, Roberto Rossellini, has invented a 
number of events in which historical personages 110uth their 
writings at mieeting4 and in imagined situations for �hich there 
is no historical evidence. In this way, Rossellini animates 
history, 114king the vritings come alive· supplying visual 
interest via intriguing background detail and character 11110ve­
ment. History, in other words, is rearranged and altered for 
aesthetic effect. 
The non1fiction filmmaker's commitment to objectivity does 
not disallow the use of devices like composite case studies. 
That is, one can make a nonfiction film of the experiences of 
the avera�e army recruit, of the characteristic behavior of a 
schizoid, a representative case study of the pli�ht of an 
unemployed (but composite) teenager, a day in the life of a 
lltedieval serf, and so on. The dramatization of corruption in 
Native Land is perhaps arguably an example of this sort of 
generalization. Such generalitin� devices project theoretical 
entities aeant to summarize the normal tendencies and types of 
events found in the kind of situation depicted. These devices 
are used in areas like journalism, history, sociology, and 
psychology, and they are legitisu.te in nonfiction film to the 
extent that they abide by the same constraints in their con­
struction that analogous devices in nonfiction literature 
respect. Moreover, such devices are rooted in the attempt to 
portray the literal truth since they are generalizations 
subject to objective criteria in terms of intersubjectively 
accessible facts. 
Throughout the preceding discussion I have relied on the 
idea that the nonfiction film can be objective, indeed that it 
is committed to objectivity, where objectivity is defined by 
the standards, routines and norlD9 o f  evidence of particular 
disciplines and modes of exposition. To adopt this strategy, 
however, is to invite a predictable ·rebuke from Cine-Marxists 
who would claim that the disciplines I am invoking 
� 
both in 
tenns of their content and their methodologies _are them­
selves so shot through, or, better yet, so contaainated with 
ideology that their purchase on objectivity is extremely 
tenuous. 
The ar�ument from ideology, like aany arguments in film 
theory, is often underwritten by such inclusiveness in its 
central terms that it borders on vacuity. Yor many film 
acholars, ideology ia virtually synonymous vtth culture; any 
nonfiction film is a cultural item� in semiotic jargon both 
ln ita signified and signifier& -- and, therefore, it is 
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unavoidably suffused with ideology.15 Clearly, vnder these 
assumptions, evetything is ideological and, consequently, the 
conoept of ideology is open to the sa...-e variety o f  criticial!t ve 
leveled earlier at the italicized concept o f  subjectivity. 
furthermore, were one to employ a narrower notion of !deology, 
it is not clear that ve would be easily convinced that evety 
existing inetitution for the acquisition and dissemination of 
knowledge is irretrievably and necessarily ideoloiical. 
Another problem with the Cine�arxist approach is that it 
tends to proceed as though there were tvo social sciences, the 
Marxist variety and the capitalist, and it assumes that these 
tvo schools are completely disjunct, :sharin� no conmon ground. 
In the c•se of ideolo�y, some Marxists speak as if only Harx­
i ste vere aware of the distortive potential of ideology. Yet, 
non-Harxist social scientists have embraced Harxist ideas 
about ideology and, in turn, they scrutinize each other's 
findings for the possibility of errors due t o  ideological bias. 
That is, non-Harx ist historians and social scientists are 
sens! tive to the dangers of ideolof'y and it is part of their 
methodological framework to be on guard against ideologically 
determined mistakes. 
When I refer to the standards and routines of different 
disciplines , I do not conceive of these as static and un­
chan�ing. Rather, these standards and routines are often 
revised, eo�etilDles in response to discoveries within the field, 
sometimes in response to changes in adjacent fields and some­
times as a result of innovations in general epistemolo�y. Such 
revisions themselves are open to intersuhjective debate and can 
be evaluated in light of factors like the added coherence they 
afford both within a given field and with other fields, in the 
increased explanatory power they provide, the degree to which 
they block certain likely avenues of error, etc. In reference 
to the ideolo�y arf'ument, I would hold that an important part 
of the Harxist perspective has been introjected into the 
practices of history and social science to the extent that 
social scientists are aware as a matter of routine of the 
threat of ideological distortion, and are, in principle, able 
to correct for ideological error. I t  is always fair �afl'e, in 
other words, for one social scientist to examine the work of 
another for ideological prejudices. Thie is not to say that 
all social science is free of ideology, but only that social 
scientists, as a matter of course, must answer charges that 
their work ie misguided because of its ideological preeump­
t ions. Thus, the existence of ideology d�s not preclude· the 
possibility of objectivity since cognizance of it is built into 
the practices of the fields where it is liable to emerge. 
The issue of ideology, of course, raises that of propa­
ganda. I have argued that the nonfiction film is such that its 
practitioners are reepon&ible to. the norms of reasoning and 
�tandards of evidence appropriate to their Particular subject 
matter. What of propaganda films -- like Triumph of the Will -­
that intentionally suppress all manner of facts � such as the 
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purge of the S . A .  -- in order to endorse a given p o l i t i c a l  
position� Such files appear t o  be counterexamples to � 
characterization of nonfiction f i l m ,  since they are expressly 
designed to violate standards of object i v i t y ,  usin£ e�ery 
rhetorical trick i o  the �ook to away audiences to their view­
point ; and yet vorks like triumoh of the Will are classified as 
nonfiction. 
To handle these cases ve must d i s tinguish between tvo 
senaes of -propaganda . - The f i r s t  is derisory. We ca l l  some­
thing •propaganda- if it callously twists the facts for po­
le•ical ends. But -propaganda- can also be thought of as the 
name of a quasi-genre, cutting across the categories of f i c t i o n  
a nd  nonfiction, devoted t o  pe r s ua s i o n ,  especially political 
persuasion. When ·propaganda" i s  used in this second sense it 
need not be pejorative. A f1h1 •Y be successfully persuasive 
vtthout bending the f a c t s ;  1 think that B a t t l e  o f  C h i l e  and 
The Sell in! of the Pentagon are examples of t h i s. Neverthe­
l e s s ,  i t  is true that !Dllny films that are �propaganda· in the 
second sense are also "propaganda· in the first sense; unques­
tionably this is why the abusive .eaning of the word took hold. 
But etymologies notwithstanding, it is important to note that 
propaganda files vould only serve as counterexamples to flJ'j 
characteri z a t i o n  of nonfiction f i l m  i f  nonfiction propaganda 
f ilms in the second sense vere necessarily prop•ganda i n  the 
first sense . That i s ,  nonfiction propa�anda films are problem­
atic for my position only vhen the tvo senses of ·propaganda· 
are conflated; by saying that nonfiction f i l maakers are commit­
ted to objectivity, 1 have not implied that a l l  of them respect 
that cOtDmitn.entj some lie, giving rise to the unsavory connota­
tions of the vord "propagand a · ;  b u t ,  in fact, it is only he­
cause i t  ls possible to eeke nonffction films of political 
advocacy that are objective -- a subclass of •propaganda· in 
t h e  second s e ns e  that ve bother t o  have the sordid naine 
·propaganda· in the f i r s t  sense. A& a genre, nonfiction prop­
aganda films are to be evaluated a�ainat objective standards 
just like any other nonfiction f i l m .  When they are caught out 
playing dovn and d i r t y  vith their tU t e r i a l s ,  ve castigate 
them a s  "propaganda• in the disdainful sense of the vord. 
Por some , Tll'J a t t empt to connect nonfiction propaganda as a 
genre vith objectivity .. Y be on a e t t l i � .  They might feel that 
propaganda as such ia inimical to objectivity. There a r e  at 
least tvo posaible ori�ina for t h i s  s e n t i me n t .  The f i r s t  
harkena back t o  a concept o f  objectivi.ty already discussed, 
v i z . ,  objectivity aeounta to representing a l l  points of v i ew  on 
a given subject. But, propag a nd a ,  by d e f i n i t i o n ,  champions 
one viewpoint, e�cluding contending p o s i t i o ns .  Therefore, 
propaganda cannot be objective. Secondly, one .. y feel that 
propaganda deals primarily with values rather than f acta. and 
further hold that the realm of values � e t h i c a l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  
se�ual , social � i s  subjective rather than objective . Again, 
the consequence is that nonf i c t i o n  propa�anda cannot be objec­
t i v e .  
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The f 1  r s t  o f  these positions i s  Quest ionable in respect to 
i t s  concept of o b j e c t i v i t y ;  it t s  really a principle of f a i r ­
n e s s  rather t h a n  a p r i n c i p l e  with epistemic impo r t .  The second 
objection a l s o  seems mistaken in i t s  presupposi t i o n s .  Morality 
a nd .  in the c.ase of propaganda, politics are objec:·tive areas o f  
discourse since they a r e  governed by intersubjectively estab­
l i shed protocols of reasoning. I do not say that we can easily 
resolve a l l  o u r  ethical (aud meta-ethic a l )  di sputes . but w e  can 
pursue our d i s a2reements obj e c t i v e l y .  Obviously, I cannot here 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  develop an attack on the view that questions of 
value are inevitably subjective , But t o  the degree that that 
position is debatable. the argument that objective propaganda 
is impossible is unconvinci n g .  
Besides propaganda. there are other genres o f  n o n f  ictton 
that do n o t ,  on the face of i t .  appear well characteriied by my 
formulations because the issue of objective standards f o r  
e v a l u a ting their claims d o e s  not seem relevant t o  the kinds of 
work they a r e ,  Two such genres are commemorations of events and 
people -- l i k e  The Eleventh Year, Man With A Movie Camera a n d  
Three Songs o f  Lenin and autobiographical films � like 
Lost, Lost, L.os t .  But are these films beyond the bounds of 
objective criticism in t e rms of the knowledge claims they roake? 
I n  the case of commemo rations, and, for that ma t t e r ,  sponsored 
travelogues, I think i t  is perfectly reasonable to say that 
they are flawed as nonfiction when they overlook unpleasant 
f a c t s .  One thing that is particularly attractive about Man 
W i t h  A Movie Camera is that it celebrates the progress and 
potential of pre-S t a l i n  Russia while at the same time ac­
knowledging p e rsist ing social problems like unemployment and 
alcoholis t'll . 
Nor are cine-autobiographies episte�ologically incorri­
g i b l e .  I f  w e  observe that Jonas �ekaa i s  perfectly a t  home i n  
the United S t a t e s .  t h a t ,  according t o  reliable eye-wi tness 
t e s timony, he never evinced any sense of l o s s ,  and was a 
s a t isfied bourgeois ,  we would be in a position to raise objec­
tions a�ainst Lost, Lost, Los t .  That i s ,  there are objectively 
accessible facts that we could use to take the measure of the 
f i lm . ·  O f  course , it might turn out in such a case that the 
purpose of the f i l m  was not to report Meka s '  experience but to 
imagine the way a melancholic �ithuanian might respond to 
immigration a n d  displacement . But then we are no longer 
dealing wit� a l y r i c  nonfiction but with a pure lyric, which 
some commentators would argue is in the province of f ictlon 
prope r )6 
I have been falling back on the notion that there are 
s tandards of research, argument, evidence and interpretation 
incorporated i n  the routines and practices of the different 
fields of knowledge produc t i o n .  I have further argued that 
these constitute objectivity in a given area of discourse and 
t h a t  nonfiction f i l m s  can be and are supposed to be objective 
in the s·ame sense that nonfiction writing i s .  Such film" , that 
i s ,  are responsible to whatever objective standards are appro­
p r i a t e  to the subject matter they are dealing w i t h .  This is 
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not to say that nonfiction fila:s are alvays true or even tha� 
they alvays meet the relevant standards of objec t i v i t y .  But ! 
do deny that nonfiction fil� are intrinsically subjective, as 
-any film theorists clai�. l deny this precisely because 
nonfiction ftlu can •et the same criteria that are 11et by 
nonfiction vri t i n g .  I have not broached the problem that the 
standards of objectivity in any given area are not alvays easy 
to for�ltze nor have 1 offered a conclusive argument against 
the skeptical objection that my so-called standards of objec­
tt vi t y are really chi.eras . Rut to attempt to �rapole v t t h  
these questions � important as they a r e  - - is bevond t h e  scope 
of this paper, for these are issues about t'he po s s i b i l i t y  of 
objectivity in any fora. My point ts st�ply that there ts no 
s pe c i a l  problec of o bjectivity confronting nonfiction f i l m  
because the concept o f  objectivity ts the sawie fo� nonfiction 
film as t t  ts for other nonf iction discourses. In fact . the 
s t andards of objectivity relevant to nonfiction f t l �  are bound 
to those of other 110des of nonfiction expo s i tion. 
8. Nonfiction Fil� and Fiction 
The arguments purport ing to shov that the nonfiction film 
!a really or even necessarily fiction resemble previous maneu­
vers tn the arguments about subj e c t i v i t y .  Ae such, they 
aantf eet -any of the saa.e weaknesses. A vezy liberal set of 
features, includin� .. nipulation, choice, structure, coding, 
the influence of ideology, 1• implicitly assumed or explicitly 
employed to define "fiction· in such a vay that it ts difficult 
to imagine anything t h a t  t s  not f i c t i o n .  Jean-Louts C omo l l t ,  
for example , virtually retreads earlier ar�u me n t s ,  exchanging 
"subjectivity• for •ttction- in his assault on direct cinema. 
He vrites:  
In reality the very fact of' filmint' ts of course 
already a productive inte�entton which modifies and 
transforms the aatertal recorded. Fr°'" the 1'K>rtte nt the 
ca.era intervenes a form of manipulation be�tns. And 
every operation, even vhen contained by the llO&t 
technical of mot ives s tarting vtth the cameras 
rolling, cutting, changing the angle or l e n e ,  then 
chooetng the rushes and e d i t i ng the� � like it or 
not. constitutes a .. ntpulatton of the ftlm�document . 
The f 11•-.aker .. Y well wiah to respect that document, 
but he cannot avoid 11anufacturing i t .  It does not 
pre�xist reportage, i t  t s  i t s  product . 
A certain hypocri•y therefore lies at the ortgtfts 
of the claim that there ts antinomy betveen direct 
ctne"8 and aesthetic .. ntpulation. And to engage in 
direct cinelft& as tf the inevitable inter·ventions and 
.. nipulations (which produce meaning, effect and 
structure) did not count and vere purely practical 
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rather than aesthetic , i a  in fact to deaend the aini­
aua of i t .  I t  �ans sweeping aside a l l  i t s  poten­
t i s l i t iee and censoring ite natural creative function 
and productivity in the na� of some i l lusory hones t y .  
non-intervention a nd  hu�i l i t y .  
A consequence o f  such a productive principle, and 
automatic conseque nce of a l l  the .anipulationa vhich 
.auld the f t lm-docuttent ta a co-efficient of "non­
r e a l t t y • :  a k i nd  o f  f i c t ional aura a t t aches i t s e l f  to 
all the filmed events and f a c t a . 1 7 
Thia sort of argument atteapts to have ita cake and eat it 
t o o .  I t  posits t h e  celluloid reproduction o f  a ding-en-stch aa 
the goal of nonfiction, notea the impossibility of the taak and 
d e c l a res a l l  f i l m  f i c t ional rather than starting o f f  v i t h  the 
obvious pre�ise that in some sense a l l  f ilae are mediated and, 
then, a t t e�pting to ascertain vhich of these caeea of mediation 
belon� to fiction and vhich to nonf i c t ion. In and of i t s e l f .  
f o l l oving the above approach -- that a l l  films are f i c t i onal 
because they are produced -- gtvea rtae to the same vexations 
rehearsed in regard to the eubjecti�ity argument. The only 
d i fference ta that now ve v i l l  be a�aktng of - f i c t ional 
f t  ct i o ns "  and " f i c t i onal nonf tct ions . ,. 
To see the line of counterattack i n  bold relief, recall 
Het z ' a  aaaertion that all film ia f i c t i onal because it repre­
sents aometninA that ta not actually occurring in the screening 
r o oa .  But i f  representation ia a sufficient condition for 
fiction then Cyril Falla ' book , The Great War 1 9 1 � - 1 9 1 8 ,  ia 
fiction because there ta no mustard gas in i t .  Het2 'a theory, 
taken a t  ita vord, implies that there are no books ,  or films,  
or epeechee l e f t  t h a t  are not f i c t i o n ,  thereby aeki n �  the 
conc.ept of fiction theoret i c a l l y  uaeleea. 
Thia counterattack can be generalized to other versions of 
the f t c t  ton argument ao that , par i  passu, v e  can demonstrate 
that arguments baaed on manipulation, choice , coding, structure 
and the like lead ue dovn the eame garden path until at the end 
ve discover the shrubbery Aroving v i l d  and e t t l l  needing to be 
separated into patches of fiction and nonf iction respectively. 
Perhaps the argument that a l l  films are f i c t tonal due to 
ideological contamination ta a bit more comp li cated atnce it 
generally not only aaaumee an expansive definition of f tctton, 
i . e . ,  fiction • ideology, but aleo an expansive definition of 
ideology. i . e . ,  ideology - culture. Yet even vith this addi­
t i o n ,  the eoral of the story ie the aame; by theoridng vith 
such undifferentiated concepts, nothing vhataoever ie said. 
Even the argument t ha t  nonfiction files a r e  fiction because 
they employ the same narrative devices aa fiction suffers this 
l ia b i l i t y .  For narration i e  common t o  t y pe s  of both fiction 
and nonf iction, a n d  n o t  a dtfferentia betveen the tvo cate­
gories. To say nonfiction fihas are f i c t tone because, for 
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example, they use flashbacks, is to sveep much historical 
writing into the duatbin of fiction. 
Hany of t he  apparently paradoxical conclusions fil• theo­
rists see• to derive result from the use of 11 1-deftned and 
overblown concep t s .  The declaration that all nonf ict1on films 
are really fictions ta a aterltng example . To rectify the 
conf uaion requires a clartf tcation of the central terms of the 
discussion. Nonfiction fil•s are those that ve evaluate on the 
'bade of their knowledge claims in accordance with the objec­
t tve standards appropriate to their subject "8 t t e r .  Produce r s ,  
writers, directors , distributors, and exhibitors index their 
fil•a ae nonf iction, thereby proespttng us to bring objective 
et andarda of evidence and argu-ent into play. We don 't char­
acteri1tically go to fil•a about which ve 111U&t guess whether 
they are fict ion or nonf ictton. They are generally indexed one 
way or the other. And ve respond accordin� to the indices, 
1auapendtng objectt ve standards if the film ta marked as fiction 
but W>biliztng them if it ta called nonfiction. 
Moreover , these responses are grounded in an ontolo�ical 
distinction between the two fonaa of expos ition. Nonf ictton 
refers to the actual world. Thus, in principle, there could be 
,evidence for each of the knowledge claims that such a film 
makes. Fiction, however ,  refers to segments of possible 
worlds. 1118of ar as many of the entities in f ictiona do not 
exist, there ta no evidence that could serve to establish 
'knowledge claill\s about them; hence, the issue of knowledge 
claims ta generally dropped altogether. 
Furthermore, the poaeible worlds ref erred to by f t. c t i ona 
are tnco•ple t e :  there are Queationa that might be asked about 
fict ions like t he  notorious tlow many children has Lady 
Macbeth?# -- that in principle have no answe r ,  even within the 
fiction. It is impossible to deal with such quest ions because 
fict ional worlda are not fully articulated. Fictions do very 
often contain correspondences with actual persona, places and 
event s ,  but they also contain descriptions of ontologically 
incomplete possible persona or places or events , or of varia­
tions on actual persona or places or events ,  that transform a l l  
t h e  entities in the f i c t ional world i n t o  ontologically incom­
plete poaaibilit iea. Ve cannot know who, for example, vaa the 
laNllord of Sherlock 's Baker Street digs in the film Pursuit 
to Algiers ; although ve know the address of the apartments , ve 
can aay l i t t l e  of their history, aave what Watson tells u s .  
Becauae f i ction• are by nature ontologically inc<Jtaplete i t  
•akee n o  • ense t o  evaluate the• according t o  obje�tive etand­
arda of evidence; no fiction i s  designed to be entirely ana­
Yerable to the canons of proof that are applied to discourses 
about the actual world. Thus, we diaregard such standards of 
evidence tout court becauae f ictione are not the kind of 
objects to which such canons are pertinent. 
A word or two about tndexin� ta in order. ln the ma i n ,  
films are distributed so that the category they a r e  intended t o  
belong t o  i s  public knowledge before they are screened. 
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A fila is billed as a docu.entary, or an adaptation of a novel, 
or as (only) based on a true story, or as a romance, e t c .  
Indexing a fil• as a fiction o r  nonfiction tells u s  vhat the 
fil• claims to refer t o ,  i . e . ,  the actual world or eeg.ents of 
possible worlds; and indexing tells us the kind of reeponsea 
and expectations it 1& leg i t i  .. te for us t o  bring t o  the fila. 
I n  short . insofar as indexing fixea the atte•pted reference of 
a given fila, indexing i s  constitutive of vlhether the given 
film is an inatance of fiction or nonf iction, vhich amounts to 
vhet�r it is to be construed aa fiction or nonfiction. 
Because issues of evaluation hing,e on indexing, oae would 
think it in the interest of producers, and distributors to be 
scrupulous in thia lllltter. Since miatakea and errors are 
defects in documentaries. calling Star Ware nonf iction, a piece 
of intergalactic history, •ight have disappointing results in 
its critical reception. Yet. t t  does seem that there are cases 
in which we are tempted to say that films are indexed improp­
erly. For i na t ance, a nonfiction propa�andiet may stage an 
i 111agined enemy atrocity in order to drum up support for hie 
country. Here we mey feel that it ie beet to · deecribe the 
initial indexing ae incorrect and that it should be indexed ae 
fict ion. But I think that once it ie indexed as nonfiction, it 
i e  more appropriate to eay that the attributed atrocity i e  
unfounded and that the f i l m  i e  being used to l i e .  The original 
indexing of a film i s  crucial; inaccurate nonfiction films 
cannot be rechristened ae fictions in order to gain a second 
hearing, though a documentary director say take a long, hard 
look at the available footage and decide to cut it in a way 
different froe what wae planned and, then, initially index the 
result ae fiction. From '1l'J perspective, the only tia-e 1t i s  
correct to speak o f  improper indexing would be when a co�dy of 
mixed-up film cans results in something like Logan ' s  Run being 
inadvertently screened on Nova. But in this case, we speak of 
that event ae an it\8tance�improper indexin� because Logan ' s  
Run hae antecedently and originally been indexed as f i c t ion by 
1ta creators and promoters . 
Films like Citizen Kane and The Carpetbaggers are indexed 
a s  fictions, but critics and viewers discover they bear strong 
analogies to the biographies of actual people. With such films 
i t  i e  easy to imagine a plaintiff suing for libel and winning. 
Here, one .. y be disposed to say that though the f il• was 
indexed as fiction, the verdict shove i t  is nonf iction. But 1 
am not sure that we are driven to this conclusion. Rather, we 
might merely eay that the film i e  11 beloue instead of claiming 
i t  ie nonfiction where •libelous· means that the film, though 
fiction. affords a highly probable interpretation, baaed on 
analogies, that ('Aueed or tends to cause the plaintiff public 
injury or disgrace. What the trial proves i s  not that the film 
is nonf iction but that the film produced daaa�e1s of a certain 
s ort. 
Ambiguously indexed f il118, certain docudramas like the TV 
aeries You Are There � also seem to raise problems for the 
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a 'ttet1pt to differentiate fiction frot1 nonf iction. In this 
aeriea frow the fifties, a fict ional reporter would travel into 
the paet to interview f a-.:>ue persona�es eabroiled in -.:>mentous 
hiatorical e•enta, e . g . ,  Waahi�ton at Valley For�e. Both the 
interview aod the interviewer were co•pletely invented, and 
their introduction renders the referents of the show ontolog­
ically inco.plete. For esa•pl e ,  it is in principle iapoe sible 
to answer tl� question of whether the interviewer had pre­
viously .et Washington, say in 1 7 5 6 .  Conseq ue n t l y ,  I am 
inclined to aay that though a•biguously indexed as a hybrid of 
fiction aod nonfiction, You Are There is fiction. This aay 
a t r ike aome aa perplesin� because t he  program aeeas obviously 
deeigned to offer inforaation about the actual vorld and it 
a l s o  in aome aenee aucceeda in ita purpose. But in response, 
v,e 11Ust note that the very uae of the interview indicates that 
the aeries was alao designed to entertain and that the desire 
to entertain vae strong enou�h to encourage a high degree of 
poetic license on the part of i t a  creators. Undoubtedly, this 
deciaion vas .ot ivated by educational as well as economic 
coneiderat i o ne ,  and it is true that education ts often f actl­
i tated through entertainment. But the fact that You Are There 
ta in part educational does not entail that it ts nonf 1 ct1on. 
People can l e a rn  things froe f i c t i o n .  That is. people can 
acquire new beliefs frot1 fictions; what they cannot do is 
appeal to the authority of a fiction as a basts for justifying 
t hose beliefa. 
In regard to the relation between fiction and nonfiction 
f tlm 1 have atreased two baste pointa. Pirat:  the concepts 
of fiction eaployed by f ila theorists to shov that non­
fiction films are really fiction are unconvincing. Like the 
arguments for the necessary subjectivity of f t l � ,  the arguments 
about fiction are advanced on the backs of overly broad con­
cepts that deny the poasibil i t y  of nonf iction in every medium 
and field of diecourae. Second: I have tried t o  sketch briefly 
a narrower picture of the boundary between fict.ion and nonfic­
t ion in order to suetain the distinction between two kinds of 
f ile. Whatever inadequacies beset this latter atte•pt do not 
reflect on •y first point; I aiay be wrong about the proper 
foraulation of the concept of fiction and s t i l l  be right that 
film theorists like Comolli need a much narrower concept than 
the ones they employ. 
III. !q>e>eltioD and !videDee 
The f iret eection of this eaaay proposed that current 
confusions over nonf ictioD film arise from poleld.cs about 
direct cine... And though i t  ia true thet the debates about 
direct cine.a brought these issues to a head, .. ny o f  the 
preauppoai t ione that energize the diacussion are deep-rooted 
and lon�-atanding. 
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One source of the invention of cinema vae science, e . �  • •  
certain breakthroughs i n  the development of the a.otion picture 
camera resulted from wor� like Marey 'a in the recording of 
.otion.  Thus, the idea of filra aa a recording device has been 
w i t h  the medium s i nce i t s  inception. Early detractors dia­
•issed cinema as a mere reproduction or automatic reproduction 
of reality. Thie dismissal was the bite noir of silent film­
aa\c.era and file theorists ali\te; in deed and vord they strove 
to ahov that fil• could artistically rearrange the world rather 
than just slavishly and mechanically duplicate i t .  But with 
the influential writings of Andre Batin the di alectic took a 
new turn. 18 The recording aspect of fil� vae again seen as 
central, only this time around it vas praised aa a positive 
virtue rather than chided aa a limitation of the medium. For 
Ba�in, the crucial feature of film is mimetic photography which 
is defined as the automatic re-p1resentation of the world. 
!very film image ia a trace of the pas t .  It is this viewpoint 
on the nature of film that leads some of the theoreticians 
cited previously to clai• that all f i l m  is nonfiction; � 
With The Wind yields evidence about Clark Gable insofar as it 
re-presents or is a trace of the un. For Ba%in, it i a  the 
nature of fil• to re-present the world. 
Bazin'a position and its various reincarnations face s t i f f  
proble•s, which have been forcefully stated by Ale�ander 
Seaonske, in accounting for fiction f i l m  and ani�tion . 1 9 But 
the position nevertneleas has a special at tra c t i veness for 
nonfiction f i lm. The notion of the automatic reproduction of 
reality a6 part and parcel of the essence of fi lm,  for e1'a11"tple, 
enjoined Caesare Zavattini to envision the ideal film as a 
atorylesa recording of ninety consecutive minutes of a day in 
the life of an ordinary man. 20 
Without question, the naivete of the view that the essence 
or destiny of film is to automatically reproduce reality 
provoked the subjectivity and fiction arguments reviewed 
already. But the problem with these responses is that in 
at tempting to show that cinema does not automatically reproduce 
reality they go too far,  insinuating that cinema can never 
faithfully record, document or bear evidence about the world. 
In order to deal w i t h  some of the problema that muddy 
thinking about nonfiction film i t  is profitable to consider the 
basic l'llOdea of representation in film. Adopting some of Monroe 
Beardsley's  ter�inology, 21  we note that each shot in a repre­
sentational photographic film physically portrays i t s  source. 
In Gone With the Wind, the shots of Rhett Butler physically 
portray Clark Gable. !very shot in a repres entational photo­
graphic fil� physically portrays i t s  source, a definite object , 
person or event that can be named by a singular ter•· Thia 
i s  the point that Bazin is making when he aaya that film repre­
sents the past; the shots in a representational photographic 
(Jlm, wtlatever our account of representation, physically por­
t ray the objects ,  persons and events that cauae the image. I f  
shots are only used t o  physically portray their aource a ,  they 24
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are recordings in the .ast basic sense of the te nll . When 
we speak of f i l 11&  as evidence we priaarUy have phy sical por­
t rayal in llind. The proble• w i t h  varioue realist appro�ches t o  
f i l •  theory i s  that they soaetimea appear t o  propose that 
phyaical portrayal is the only use of shot s ,  or that it is the 
essential or _,st iaportant use. 
But a t  the same tiae that a f i l m  physically portrays i t 6  
aource (some s pe c i f i c  object or event ) it also depicts a class 
or congeries of obje c t s .  A shot frOl!I Gone With The Wind 
physically portrays Clark Gable but i t  also depicts a man; 
likewise a shot of the White House phys ically portrays the 
White House but also depicts a house. Each representational 
shot in a fil� physically portrays i t s  source and depicts a 
meaber of a class describable by a general tenn -- a ma n ,  a 
f i r e ,  a house , e t c .  Thus. in a given f i l m ,  a shot can be 
preaented via i t s  context in a way that what is discursively 
iaportant about i t  is not what it physically portrays but what 
it depicts. tn Kan With A Movie Camera there is an image of a 
hammer throwe r .  W11a t  is discursively significant about it is 
that it is an ieage of a Soviet athlete, not that i t  is an 
iaaa�e of a particular Ivan. Because f i l m  images depict classes 
as well as phy s i c a l l y  portraying individuals. they can be used 
to stand for kinds in coamun i c a t i on contexts where their 
relation to their e pe c i f  ic sources is irrelevant. 
Depiction, so to apeak, pries the individual shot from i t s  
a pe c i f i c  referent and i n  doini s o  opens u p  another possibilitv 
of cinematic representation. The shot physically portraying 
Clark Cable depicts a aa n ,  and given the context of Gone With 
The Wind, i t  also represented Rhett Butler. This form of 
representation. which we aay call nominal portrayal, occurs 
when a ahot represents a particular person, object or event 
d i f ferent than ita photographic provenance, due to i t s  context 
as a reault of fac�rs like commentary, t i t le s ,  an onioing 
story or editing. ln liiht of f i l •  history, nominal portrayal 
is the most iaportant use of shots. Obviously i t  is the 
sine qua non of fiction films. But i t  i s  also indi spensable in 
nonfiction films,  even those other than historical re-enact-
11ents. The uae of atock footage, for instance, of strike 
breaking in Union Maida or naval bombardaents in Victory at Sea, 
i s  baaed on ahots that depict policemen and battleships so that 
they can be contextualized i n  order to nominally portray the 
apec1.fic eventa the f i l m  diacuases . FurtheTIDore, a ahot of the 
Capitol Building taken in 19 29 might accompany a soundtrack 
that atates that such and auch a b i l l  was passed In 19 3 4 . 
Strictly •peaking, t h i s  is a case o f  nominal portrayal since i t  
repreaents tbe Capitol Buildi� .a t  a t i me  other than that of 
the .. king of the shot. We do not take this use of such a shot 
(which i s  common in nonfiction production) to be a matter of 
lying -- unlesa the com�ntary explicitly claims the shot vas 
taken at the moment the b i l l  was passed -- because we under­
atand that shots can not only be used as recording units but 
also as exposi t i onal units. And nominal portrayal is the 
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representational practice that m>at facilitates cineeatic 
exposit ion. 
By d i s t i nguishing between physical portrayal, nominal 
portrayal and depict i o n ,  we can clarify eome of the great 
debate& of f i l m  theory. Realist theorists tend to overem­
phasi�e the importance of physical portrayal in f i l m .  
Hontagie t s ,  o n  t h e  other hand, are proponents o f  nominal 
portrayal, especia lly of the way editing can function as an 
agency for th is type of representation. The 110ntagiete did 
not invent nominal portrayal i n  f i l m  but they did 
aggressively conceptuali�e ite relationship to editing. I f  
the 110ntagiata erred, i t  i a  probably in their extreme 
deprecation of the photographic C011tponent in f i l m .  At t i ?M s ,  
i n  their enthusiasm, they aeem to be· not only denying the 
importance of physical portrayal in f i l m  but aleo claiming that 
a ehot can be made to depict anything whatsoever 
(depending on i t e  poeition in an edited s e q ue n ce ) .  But it i e  
hard to imagine, given exiet ing eymbol eyetems, how any 
amount of editing could 11111ke a clean, medium long shot of Lenin 
depict an ice cream soda. In fac t ,  what a ehot depict& 
guides the 110ntagi e t ' a  selection of vhat shots will be choeen 
to nominally portray the persons, objecte and evente that 
CQQlprise the subject of the f i l m .  Neverthe lees, historic a l l y , 
the Soviets in de-emphasi�ing the importance of physical 
portrayal we:re 110re right about the direction of the cultural 
use of film than the realist theori s t s .  
The distinction between d i f ferent 110des o f  cinea.etic 
representation aleo enahles us to characterite a numbe r of 
belief& that sustain conundrums about nonfiction film. On the 
one hand, those who claim that every film is nonfiction do so 
on the basis that every ehot physically portrays i t s  eource. 
But i t  does not f ollow that whole films made up of such shots 
are physical portrayals. Casablanca ie composed of ehote that 
individually portray Boga r t ,  Bergman, Raines, Lorre, Dalio, 
V e i d t ,  and Henreid, b u t  it i e  not a recordin� of theee people: 
to see Casablanca as a record of Bogart in front of a camera is 
a s  inappropriate aa eeeing a Catholic priest at the Offertory 
of the Hsse ae a toastmaster. 
Arguments denying the possibility of objective nonfiction 
also often proceed frOUl overemphasis on physical portrayal. 
Theee theoreticians presup1>0ee that for a film to be an objec­
tive nonfiction meana that the film w i l l  be a physical por­
trayal of ice eourcee. Thue, they immediately suspect any uee 
of nominal portrayal or depiction i n  a putative nonfiction 
f i l m .  Moreover, though i t  ie eaey to think of individual ehots 
as re-presentations ( i n  the eenae o f  physical portray a l ) ,  the 
concept is not readily adaptable to whole filme. This i s  one 
reason why editing present& problems to many nonfiction theo­
r i s t s ,  i . e . ,  they begin to wonder how films can be said t o  
genuinely re-present (physically portray) the p a e t ,  given the 
ellipse& of editing. Their problem, in part, i s  that they are 
ueing the individual ehot, understood as a physical portrayal, 
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aa a model for vhat a nonfiction f i l m  should be, and then they 
find a l l  the candidates vanttn". It would be better to drop 
the tntut t t on· that the shot aa physical portrayal 1a the 
paradigm of ctne11attc nonfict i o n .  
The typical nonfiction ftl11 mixes physical Portrayal, 
nominal portrayal and depiction. A ftl• ta not nonf tc�ton tn 
terms of t h e  modes of ctnel"Utic repreaentat.ton 1t does or 
doean ' t  e•ploy, but tn terms of tta cc.mitment to the standards 
of argu�nt, evidence and exposition that are appropriate to 
the type of t n f  ormatton it presents. "y key point tn thta 
regard ta that what ta t�portant but aomettmea forgotten about 
nonfiction f i l ms  ta that tn general they are expos itory, and 
are to be evaluated tn light of the aaaerttona they are used to 
make. 1'hia is not to deny that ftltAS and f o,ota"e can also be 
evidential io the sense that the ahota within the f 1 1 �  are a l l  
used t o  physically portray their aourcea and that their ae­
auenctng ta presented aa a reliable record of an event. aut 
thta type of nonfiction film ta neither the vhole of the genre 
nor a prtvtleged or central instance thereof. 
In aany nonfiction f t l ms ,  i t  ta tmpoaatble for the viever 
to t e l l  by looking whether the footage t a  a literal physical 
portrayal of the objects, persons and events it purp,orts to 
represent, ao we are beat advised to greet such images as 
noaitnal portrayals. Howeve r, thta ta not to a a y  that films do 
not often present footage as a physical portrayal of t t a  
source, t . e . ,  a s  a t ratghtfoIWard recording. Where foota"e t a  
proffered aa a recording i t  ta open t o  ques tions about tta 
authent i c i t y .  I n  t h i s  regard i t  t a  no d i f ferent than a n y  other 
document. U l t t aa t e l y ,  some questions will not be answerable t n  
t e niua  o f  what t a  on the screen but w i l l  require recourse t o  
production recorda a nd  wttneaaea. B u t  the f a c t  that i t  c a n  be 
difficult to tell on the baata of the fil• itself whether or 
n o t  i t  t a  a legimete recording does not pose problems f o r  the 
poaatbtltty of uatng footage as a record, atnce there are other 
means for authenticating tta ortgt ns .  
In some instances, f oota"e w i l l  be used to provide a record 
of a a pe c i f  ic event aa well as evidence in support of an 
assertion about the situation it refers t o .  Here the foota�e 
ta again open to queations about whether or not it ta authentic 
as well aa to question.a about whether it ta good evidence for 
the claims it ta supposed to support. In Chariot of the Goda 
ve are shown an image of a Mexican f rteze that ta meant t o  
persuade u s  that Central Americans had knowledge of apaceahtpa 
prior to the European 1�asion. The f rteze depicts some 
whooshes sculpted onto the back of a chariot. But this ta 
hardly enough to substantiate f a�tltartty wtth interplanetary 
apace vehicles, even tf the foota"e ta authen t i c .  
Where sequences of footage a r e  spliced together and are 
presented aa reliable recordings of events, queattona of 
authenticity arise again. The way the footage t a  edited can be 
open to dispute; the adequacy of an edited recording aa&y be 
challenged t n  tents of w t t neaaea and, aa occurs in legal 
contexts, by a review of the out-take s .  27
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In short� whether a nonfiction fil• is primarily e�posi­
t ional and uses its foota�e to ne>minally portray events or 
�hether it presents its footage as physical portrayal, i t  i s  
s t i l l  responsible t o  establi shed standards of objectivi t y , 
though in the l a t t e r  ca se the fil� v i l l  be open to further 
c r i t i c i s m  if it i l l i c i tly claims i t s  footage is a physical 
portrayal of i t s  s ubje c t .  
I v .  A Digreaeion: �alie• a nd  Nonf i c t ion 
So far, l have stressed the shared rhetoric of the defense 
of deep-focus realis� -- the cine11)3tic sty le of Renoir and the 
Neorealists, advocated by Bazin -- and that of direct cinema. 
Indeed a recent antholo�y, Realism and the Cineiua, at times 
shifts seamlessly fr� pieces on nonf i c t ion to pieces on 
realism. The relation between the deep-focus style of realism 
and d i rect ctne11)3, of course, is one of influence; practi­
t ioners of ctnema-ver i te adopted and adapted Renoi r ' s  (and 
Bazin ' s )  conceptions of fra�ing. of the i mPortance of carnera 
movement and of the value of spontaneity. 2 3  The interplay of 
t he theory of deep-focus realism and documentary practice gives 
the impression that there is a link between one style of 
f ilmmaking and truthfulness, and that in virtue of that link 
one style of filmtb9king is more appropriate to nonf ict ion f i l m  
than any other. 
The style of deep-focus realism is defended because i t  
encoura�es spectators t o  participate more actively i n  the 
cons t ruction of meaning i n  a f i l �  than, for example , the style 
of montage f i l mmaking . Directorial control appears to be 
relaxed so that the spectator appears free to assimilate the 
succession of imagery i n  h i s  own vay. This freedom i s  c&lled 
real is tic because it is anal ogous to the kind of choic·e and 
freedom ve e�perience when we scan everyday reality for inf or­
mation about how things stand. Purportedly, this style of 
realism enables us to make up our own minds rather than molding 
the vorld according to the f ilm!IMlker1a preconceptions . And, of 
course , the notion of presenting the vorld without preconcep­
tion& is particularly alluring to the practit ioner of direct 
cinema .  
Yet, the idea that the style of deep-focus realism i s  
truthful or has a special potential for re-presenting reality 
i s  problema t i c .  No cinematic technique in and of itself 
guarantees t r u t h .  For any film technique o r  set of techniques 
can appear i n  either a fiction or nonf ict ion film. Some 
t e chniques may be historically associated vith docu-mentartes; 
but they can always be incorporated for expressive effect in 
f i c ti o ns ,  e . g . ,  grainy, fast film stock. Deep-focus realism, 
in fact , is a n  en&emble of techniques that coalesced 1n fiction 
films, a s t range place for a style that is truth-preserving to 
evolve. 
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The confuaion between realisa and truth i s  �rounded in a 
ariaconception of "hat it means to consider a style of film­
making real i s t i c .  In m:>at writing, if an author calls a fil� 
or a style real i s t i c ,  this is taken to signal a two-term 
relationship between the f i l m  and r eality.  Realism is thought 
of as a trans-historical category inclusively denominatinfi' any 
f i l •  or f i lm style that corresponds to reality.  Renee. 1 !  the 
deep-focus style is real i s t i c ,  then it corresponds to r e a l i t y ,  
a nd  i ns o f a r  a s  t h e  nonf iction filmmaker i s  committed t o  cor­
r ea ponding to reality,  he is urged to employ this s t y l e .  
But realism in f i l m  o r  i n  any medium i s  not s simple 
relationship between a representation and r e a l i t y .  first end 
fore..os t ,  r e a l i s m  designates a style and in this role it points 
to a d i f f e rence between �ontrasting f i l 11S ,  paintings, nove l s ,  
e t c .  To c:.a l l  a film o r  a group of films realistic i s  t o  call 
a t tention to aotle feature that the ite•s in question have that 
other fil 10 don't have. Rules of the Game, for example ,  
employs a aeries of multi-plane compositions that induce the 
apectator to s c a n  the frame for dramatic details and i n f  lec­
ti o ns .  This d i f fers from the type of composition found in 
Soviet montage or in the soft-focus of Hollywood fillU of the 
thirtie s .  The term wrealis�· m&rka this contrast. But why i s  
"realism· used t o  do the marking? Because spectator scanning, 
a poa s i bility inhibited by Soviet montage or the soft-focus 
a t y l e ,  is taken to be more like our nortl81 perceptual behavior 
than our reaction to the composition i n  alternate s t y l e s .  But 
deep-focus realism does not correspond to r e a l i t y .  Rather i t  
i a  more lfke some a s pe c t s  o f  reality when compared t o  alternate 
approaches to fil111m11king. A film or f i l m  atyle is r e a listic 
�hen it deviates from other & 'l)t! c i f ied films or atyles i n  such a 
"aY that the deviation can be construed as like aome aspect of 
reality t h a t  was hitherto repressed or merely absent in pre­
vious filDs or f i l m  s t y l e s .  Realism i s  not a simple relation 
between f i l as  and the world but a relation of contrast bet�een 
f ilms that ia interpreted in virtue of analogies to aspects of 
reality. Given this, it is eaay to aee that there is no single 
Film Realism -- no trane-historical atyle of realis� i n  f i l m .  
Rather there a r e  aeveral ty'l)t!s of realiam. There ia Soviet 
realiam which because of its maaa hero and details of prole­
tatian life deviated from the individualism and glamour of 
Hol lywood narratives in such a way that aspects of reality, 
cl.aaa action and lower class living condi tions, were fore­
grounde d .  Deep-focus realiam emphasized yet another dimension 
of reality in filQ. Ita arrival did not force us to atop 
calling the Soviet fil•s realistic but only to recognize that 
another variety of realism had been introduced . Because 
·realiamM ia a term whose application u l t i ma t e l y  involves 
historical comparisons, it should mot be used unprefixed -- we 
should apeak of Soviet realiam, Neorealia�, Kitchen Sink and 
Super realiam. None of these developments s t r i c t l y  correspond 
to or duplicate r e a l i t y ,  but rather 1111ke pert inent (by analogy) 
a s 'l)t! c t s  of reality absent from other atylea. Furthet"lllore, once 
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w e  abandon t h e  correspondence conception o f  realism, there ia 
no reason to presuUlle that one cineaetic style ia correct for 
a l l  nonfiction f i l •. 
T h i s  ia not to de n y  t h e  importance of direct cinema 's 
espousal of the Renoir/Bazin ethos of deep-focus and caaera 
U10vement . The expressive effects of this choice were (and 
s t i l l  are) far reaching. The s pe c t a t o r ' s  role in relation to 
the screen vas redefined, encouraging in ua the act ive and 
apont aneous play of opinion, judRment and decision. In a f i l m  
like Warrendale, it is l e f t  u p  t o  ua to decide whether the 
regiae of that institution is barbaric and irresponsihle, on 
the one hand, or curative and caring on the other. The rela­
tive freedom of the spectator and ita precond i tion, the rela­
tive slackening of overt evaluation on the part of the film­
aake r, may suggest one se1\8e of objectivity -- namely that of 
aakin� a place where a l l  opinions �ay flourish. But this is a 
political -- i n  fact historically liberal -- concept of objec­
t i v i t y ,  not an epistemic o n e .  And indeed i t  is as an expres­
sive emblem of egalitarianism, a major preoccupation o f  the 
s i xt i e s ,  that direct cinema ' s  adoption of the Bszinian creed i a  
.aat significant . 
V .  Concluding General JletMrlta 
My overall atrate�y in this essay h8B been to argue that 
there is nothing s tie c i a l  or essential to film as a medium that 
raises uniOue problems for the notion of nonfiction f i l � .  
I have constantly compared nonfiction f i l m  w i t h  nonfiction 
writing in order to answer the charge that in so� way the 
inevitability of the 1110des of selection, 115nipulation, 
e.tc . .  endemic to cinema produce special probleu for film 
in regard to nonfiction. Hy approach, here, is part of a 
larRer conception of cine.a. I believe that film, perhaps 
because it is a recent medium, invented within living memory, 
has developed primarily by imitating and incorporatinR pre­
e�ist ing cultural practices and concerns. Cinema bas been 
adapted to ma\e narrative, to make drama and to .ake art a s  
well a s  nonfiction. The medium, in short, dis covers i t s e l f  i n  
t h e  process of e n l i s t ing and assimilating previoualy 
es tablished structures , for•e, goals and values. Understanding 
f i l m ,  therefore, 1a0at often depends on applying the concepts 
and criteria appropriate to the broader or older cultural 
projects that cinema m i me s .  
B y  urging t h i s  perspective I a� �oing against the grain of 
much traditional film theory which centered on d i scovering and 
elucidating what is unique to film -- what ia peculiarly (and 
essent ially) cinema t i c .  The notion that sub,jectivity flows 
from the special processes of the f i l m  medium i a ,  in f a c t ,  a 
variation, though a negative one, on this tradit ional theae; 
rather than outlinin� f i l m's peculiar, positive potent i a l ,  i t  
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wane to acknowledge fil•'• special limitations. My ?O•ition 
on the nonfiction film, in contradi stinction, ie that no 
ai>ecial epistemological problems result frOtll the distinctive 
f eaturee of the mediu�. On the ieaue of the essential nature 
of f il•, I hold that fil• hae no eeeence, only ueee, �at of 
which are derivative and aub.1ect to analysis and evaluation 
according to the categories that apply to their sources � art, 
draae, narrative, nonfiction, and a o  on. 
In �phaeizing the relatedness of f i l m  to larger cultural 
proj ect • ,  l a� not clai•ing that there are no dif ferences 
between film and the other media in which those projects are 
pursued but only that in coaprehending film aa, for example, 
a r t ,  or nonfiction, the conceptual fra111evorka of those in­
sti tutionalized endeavor& are more fundamental than questions 
about the nature of film aa f i l m .  Undoubtedly, the vivid 
portrayal of ti..e and process in Piehing a t  Stone Weir, the 
immediate intelligibility of the construction of the igloo in 
Nanook of the North, and the revelation of the inti .. te inter­
play of the rhyth�. econcray and society of the !�ung Buah'9en in 
The Hunters would be difficult, if not practically impos s i ble, 
t o  duplicate in written accoun t s .  Sometimes a picture ia worth 
a thousand vorde, thou�h, of course, ao11eti11ea a single word 
can do the work of a thousat\d pictures. The upshot of this is 
not that some topics categorically belong to cinema and some to 
language e nd  that these can be antecedently plotted by estab­
lishing the unique potentials or lieitat ione of the medium. 
There i e  no subject or project that is inherently adverse to 
cinet1a. Rather some films fail and others do not. Films can 
be a r t i s t i c ,  objective, dramatic, e t c .  Or they can f a i l  in 
theae a t t e111pta. But thie ia a ma t t e r  of individual caaee and 
not of unique features of the 11edium that dictate failure in 
advance. 
To underscore f i l m'• indebtedneea to broader cultural 
enterprieee for i t a  ..arching orders and to abandon the quest 
for the cinematic is not to deny that there ie an important 
area of etudy called film theory. Queatione s t i l l  re..ain about 
how the f 11• medium is able to incorporate and i•plement the 
larger cultural f ramevorke that it ie heir t o .  For example, 
hov does narrative editing function aa a system of communica­
tion? furthe�re, aa f i l m  develops, pursuing the ai111S of 
project• like a r t ,  nonfiction and narrative, it evolves new 
98aa. of axpreaaion whose operation i t  ie the task of film 
theoriata to illuminate. At certain juncturee1 like the riee 
of direct cine.a, the onset of nev e ty l ia t i c  option• precipi­
tate• a dialogue or dialectic vtth tradit ional forms of film­
••king t h a t  the theoriat muat unravel and clarify. Fil• does 
not have a unique destiny, aet by i t a  easential poe&ibi l i tiea 
and limitationa. But it does have a unique history ae i t  ie 
uaed to articulate the enterprises of twent ieth century cul­
ture. And the rhyme and reason wi thin that process is the 
topic of f i l m  theory. 
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V I .  Poetacript: Miacelleneooe ArgQm!!nta 
Since this article vas completed several art:umrnts against 
the nonfiction fil• have come to my attention which 1 had not 
encountered before, or which I had forgotten. I would li�e to 
review three of the arguments briefly because they are auch in 
use at present. 
I vill approach tvo of the arguments by �aaining a passage 
fro• Stephen Heath's influen t i a l ,  recent book queettons of 
Cineaa. The quotation pertains to making historical nonfiction 
f11aa . Heath beli eves it i s  an idealist fallacy if such f1lll\8 
pretend to depict the past accurately. Historical nonfiction 
films cannot achieve such a goal 1 )  because they are trapped in 
hetweneutic circles � i . e . ,  such films always perforce are 
locked in a present standpoi n t ,  trapped in the needs and 
conc:ernB of the now which distorts while determining the 
picture of the past that such films "8aquerade as portraying 
truthfully � and Z )  because such historical f 1las are in fact 
merely constructionB of the past. Heath writes: 
What needs particularly to be emphasized here ie 
that history in c1neaaa la nowhere other than in 
representation, t h e  l et'lla of representing 
proposed, precisely the historical present of any 
fila; no, film la not a document of itself and of 
its actual situation in respect of the 
cinematic inBtitution and of the complex of social 
i ne t 1tut1one of representation. Which is t o  
say t h a t  t h e  automatic conjunction of f i l �  and 
history as-theme, as past to be ahown today, the 
strategy for a cine-ma developed to recover 'popular 
memory , '  la an idealist abstraction, an ideal 
of film and an ideal of history. The present of a 
film is always historical, just as history le 
alvaya p1reaent - a fact of representation not a fact 
of the past, an elaboration of the presence of 
the past� a conBtruction in the present, for 
today • • • •  4 
As I have already noted, there are at least two arguments 
in this denee passage. One of these holds that the researche r ' s  
point-of-vi ew ,  rooted as i t  i s  i n  the present , blocks an 
accurate vi� of the p a s t .  This is an argument from selection 
of a type with which we are elready faai l i a r .  Historians and 
f1l1UW1kera who make historical f1las select and interpr e t .  
They screen out certain facts and connect others. t n  doin� this 
screening out, this selection and this interpretation, they are 
�overned by the interests of the present. Thus� the f 1lae they 
give us are not replicas of the pest but are perspectively 
skewed representations of the past,  .indelibly imprinted by the 
issues of the present. Moreov e r ,  ve are eaanared in such views 
because ve have no access to the past eave through the optic of 
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the present. The historical fil mma ker offers theses about the 
p a s t  fro. the concerns of the pr�ent and alao selects his 
evidence for these theses on the basis of the concerns of the 
present . Countervaili� evidencep not sensitive to present 
conce rns, will be overlooke d .  We cannot accurately retrieve 
the Past. We are fro�en in the present and our historical 
f ilms really reflect contemporary preoccupations more than 
anything e l se. 
The f ir a t  point to be •de against this .ode of argumen­
tation is that historical films are not su�posed to be replicas 
of the pas t .  Indeed, vhat i t  would take to be a replica of the 
past is unclear. Would it have to be a representation of the 
past and past events depicted exactly as they were seen, 
experienced and cogni%ed by peoples in the past? If s o ,  then 
history clearly has little to do vtth such replicas. for 
history need not be restricted to the purview of the p a s t .  
Juat becauae t h e  A l l i e s  a t  Versailles i n  1919 failed t o  foresee 
the consequences of the stern terma of the treaty does not mean 
that a nonfict ion f i l �maker sl�uld not make the appropriate 
cauaal conne ctions in his ctneeatic account of the rise of the 
Third Reich. I n  fact ve �ight even want to argue that histor­
ical films as opposed to mere records -- in general are 
expected to connect past events and actions to consequences 
that the historical a�ents who performed the actions were of ten 
unaware of. H i s tory -- aa opposed to chronicling -- is about 
Making connections between events and in many cases the later 
events being connected to earlier events are unbekn01imst to the 
hiatortcal actors. This does n ' t  d i s q ua l i f y  a fil� as accurate 
history even if the film ia not a mysterious a.omething called a 
replica. 
If hiatory is a matter of making connections between events 
and if of ten earlier events are connected to events in the 
present . we have a t i l l  not ahown that historical filma are 
necessarily mired i n  the episte11M>logically· suspect present . 
For even t f  peat events are aelected and combined with other 
events in line with present concerns , it is not the case that 
the claim& made by histories and historical films are sub­
atantiated on the grounds that they satisfy present pre­
occupations. Whatever causal connections or threads of events 
that a historical f i l m  purports must be supported by evidence. 
Satisfyit1${ the needs of the present. that t s ,  does not warrant 
a historical claim. Only evidence w i l l  support whatever claims 
a historical film makes. Nor i s  it true that the only evidence 
available to ua 1a the evidence tbat ve vill aele�t because of 
our present i n teres t s .  For even i f  on our own we could only 
find such evidence as our present needs and concerns guide us 
t o .  there is nevertheless a vast accumulation of unavoidable 
evidence that has been bequeathed t o  us by past generations of 
historians whose ·present• interests led them to amass the many 
details that our historical accounts -- f i l aae d  or written -­
must gibe with. (Moreover .  I aust also object he nneneutic 
circles notwithstanding -- that it i s  possible for researchers 
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to imaginatively transcend their ties to the present to con­
ceive of the past froa a l t ernative viewpoints - both those of 
dif ferent ti-s and of different cultures ) .  
The aecood argu�nt found i n  the Reath paaaa�e doe& not 
apply only to historical fil.s but to nonfiction& in general . 
films are said to be constructions, apecif1ca1·1y representa­
tions. Within conte•porary film theory, t h i a ,  in ccabination 
vith the fact that such repre9entations do not internally 
acknowledge their status u constrvctions - .. . . .  no film ia a 
document of i t s e l f  • • •  • � entails that a film is a deception. 
A nonfiction film of this sort necessarily could not be ob­
jective because i t  i s  necessarily a l i e .  That i a ,  nonfiction 
films that do not acknowledge that they are constructions 
thereby mask the fact that they are construc t i o n .  Thia i a  
thought to be a deception that a90unta to f alaification. 
Though this argument i s  vety popular among contemporaty 
f i l m  theoris t s ,  i t  is somewhat ob8cure. All films including 
nonfiction films are seen as f alaifica t i ona unless they ac­
knowledge that they are constructions by �arut of represen­
t a t  iona intet'l\al to the film ( i n  the .. nner of the Godardian 
avant-�ard e ) .  What doe& this mean? All films are construc­
t i o ns .  i t  ia said. ·construct ions , "'  one asks. ·rather than 
what!"' One answer i a :  "'rather than the very events - his­
torical or otherwise -- that the film represen t s . - Of course, 
this i a  true. Indeed, it ia ao obvious that one wonders why 
the point has to be made - acknowledged - within the f il• 
i t s e l f .  Often nonfiction f i ltll8 do, i n  fact, refer to the 
process of production vhich resulted in the film we are eeein� 
e .g . ,  the arduous trip to such and such a mountain village 
ia unde rscored. But even where this does not occur , wouldn ' t  
things like the t i t l e  cred i t s ,  advertiae.en t s ,  reviews, e t c .  
t e l l  normal viewers (as i f  they normally needed t o  be t o l d )  
that the nonfiction films in question are constructions? Why, 
that i a ,  ia i t  neceasa1y to represent or to acknowledge the 
proceaa of the f i l � • s  construction within the f i l m  i t s e l f ?  I t  
simply i s  not the case - a s  aome f i l m  theorists might hold 
that viewers take films without such acknowled�nts to be 
something other than construct ions . And , aa 1 have already 
pointed out, such films conventionally announce they are the 
construction of a team of fil..akera - who employed proceaaea 
of production like e d i t ing by 1Rans of the cred i t s .  
When many contemporary film theorists, like Heath, ref e r  to 
a film aa a cons truction or a production, they have in mind not 
that moat films have been produced by a team of filmmakers - a 
fact the filas supposedly mask and which -.Jat be reflexively 
revealed but that films are constructed by spectators �o 
make sense out of the f i l ms .  SometitRes this process of making 
sense ia called auture. 25 Thia suturing is unacknowledged or 
not represented within the film. Consequently. i t  is thou�ht 
that this aspect of the f i l m ' a  construction is hidden from the 
spectator. Aga i n ,  the charges of deception and f alai fication 
loom. The spectator thinks the film mekes aenae when in fact 
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the spectator .. kea (or construc ts)  aenae Oc.Jt of the fil•. An 
edited nonf iction fil• like Turkaib 1• conatructed bT the spec­
tator comprehending the "mEaniog of and ukiog connectione be­
tween the shots in t he  fUa. HO'feve r ,  the fil• doe• not acknc:M­
ledge that the spectator ts performing this operation. There­
fore, the f .1 1 •  l i n ,  deceptively ••king that it ia • construc­
tion. 'nle fil•'• veracity 1a called into question because the 
fil• doea not reaind the spectator - thrOc.Jgh ao• proceaa of 
representation inteT"n.41 to the file � that he 1• deciphering 
the ••ning of the fila. 
Thi• argu•nt aee.. to rely on a false dichotoay, vi� . ,  
either the fil• construct• it• ••niog, or the spectator doea. 
It ia alao •••u•d that if the spectator'• interpretive ac­
tivity, hie suturing, ia not eaphaaized by the fila, then the 
fil• deceptively insinuates that the film, not the spectator, 
ta constructing ita ••ning. Sut clearly it .ia inappropriate 
t o  hold that there ia • univocal aense to the phraae ·construct 
meaninR• auch that ve •u•t decide • coepetition between .u­
tually exclusive alterna tives euch •• "'either fil• or specta­
tor• construct ••ning, but not both.• A film is ••ningf ul,  
intelligible, e t c .  in virtue of i t a  structure. That ta,  the 
arrange•nt of it• .ateriala deterainea whether it ha• aucceaa­
f ully ·conatructed meaning· in what ve can think of •• the 
•••age aenee of that phrase. The apect11tor, in turn, in rea­
ponae to the film might be said to ·cons truct ••ning � where 
thia eignifiee the operation of • cognitive proceaa. We •ight 
c a ll thie the eeeeage-uptake eea.e of the phras e .  Thua, it ta 
ca11patible for the file to appear ••ningf ul -- to be the 
eource of ••ning - while it  reuim for • a,pector to iapute 
••ning to the f il• by mobilizing a cognitive proceaa. That 
the fil• ie •aningfully structured doea neither preclude nor 
hide the fact that • spectator actively derives ••ning from 
the fila, i . e . ,  ·conatructs meaning• (according to thia 11e>de of 
apeakin g).  And surely every spectator knows that aeantng in 
the aense of the spectator'• recognition of meaning ( i . e . ,  
me•••ge-uptake) require• • spectator'• discerning and compre­
hending the structure of • f ila. That i a ,  •the construction of 
meaning , ·  where that refer• to the experience 
-- via co�nitive 
prooeaaing -- of intelligibility, obviously haa • specta tor'• 
portion. So why auat thia be acknowledged within the film? 
Moreover, the legitimate though different and ca11patible aense 
of ·meani� construction· (the meaaa�e aenee), which refers to 
the structure or arrangement of • film'• .. teriala, doe• not 
iaply that the apectator•a cognitive proceaaing of meaoing ta 
in any way effaced or hidden. 
I waa reminded of the final argument against nonfiction 
f ila while watching the recent movie Lianna by writer-director 
John Saylee. In thia film, there ta • portrayal of • college 
cineu claaa, circa, it aeems to me ,  1970. The lecturer 
repeat• • point that wee • popular slogan in regard to docu­
mentary film in the aixtie• and early seventies. He notes that 
quantua phyaiciata discovered that by observing aub-atoaic 
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events they changed C h e  course of the events they were studying 
by introducing unforeseen but necessary d i sturbances into the 
s i t u a t i o n .  Science shows, the lecturer in Lianna c l a i 11& 1  thac 
observation always alters the situa tion i t  s t rives to c•pture 
objectively. Thia generalization ta then applied to fil•. 
Once a ca.era is i n troduced into a situa tion� the aituation 
changes. People begin to behave for the camera, for e•a•p l e .  
T hu s ,  the principle t h a t  rules the obeervation o f  the atom 
applies equally to the act of f ilming hum.ans . No f i l e  can be 
objective -- i . e  • •  can render an even� as i t  i s  typically.  eans 
camera --- because fil•ing alvaya changes events. Thia i s ,  
moreover, j u s t  one i n& tance o f  a law that applies t o  every 
a s pe c t  and order of � ing in the physical univ e r s e .  Observa­
tion must a l t e r  the behavior of whatever ta observed 
Thia argument dubiously assuaea that whatever holds as a 
ma t t e r  of law a t  the sub-atomic level applies to every level 
and mode of expe rience. Therefore, since our presence can be 
f e l t  d�astically on the atomic level, i t  i s  hypothe9ized that 
it is also always f e l t  drastically on the !UCroacopic level. 
In f a c t ,  howeve r ,  the presence of an observer has l i t t l e  pal­
pable physical effect at a l l  on the macroscopic level. Bue 
this 18 noc the mo s �  damning point to raise about the argument. 
J:'or the arg,naen� proceeds by extrapola t i �  fro• the phys i cal 
effect of observation on an atom t o  a putative behavioral ef­
f e c t  that a calll!ra has on the people it f i l me .  But even tf a 
camera did have aome alUtOst indetectable physical influence on 
every objecc in i t s  v i c i n i t y .  i t  need not have an influence on 
every person i �  films . The camera 11&y be very far away or hid­
den, so that its subjects are unaware that it i s  observing 
them. Thus, it has no behavioral repercussions. Or perhaps 
the subject of the ca.era is habituated to the camera ' s  pres­
ence and the subject acts naturally as a resul t .  "aybe the sub­
ject is emotionally carried away and j u s t  does n ' t  modify his 
behavior because he does n ' t  care that the camera ta nearby. 
These and hundreds of other reasons can be offered to show that 
in 11&ny cases the presence of an observing camera does not nec­
ceaaarily change the event frocn the vay i t  vould have been had 
the camera bee� absent . Nor can the discovery of the physical 
e f f  ecta of observation on particles in qtl.9ntum mechanics be 
used to suppor� this claim. For even if the presence of the 
camera resulted in some physical cha.ngea in the situation, tvo 
adulterous lovers unaware of the private eye acroea the alley­
way will not change their behavior despite the fact that a bat­
tery of cameras is pointed their vay. I am not denying that the 
presence of a camera in a situation might change i t .  I am 
denying both that the preaence of a camera mu s t  necessarily 
change a s i tuation at the level of human behavior and that the 
claim that car&eraa must change human behavior can be gleaned 
f r am  discoveries of the physical ef f ecta of observation upon 
a t o 11& .  
36
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 14 [1983], No. 1, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol14/iss1/1
40 "O!l. CJIROLL 
1'0T!S 
1 .  Thie argument vas .. de fr 011 the floor at the conference, 
·pu 111, the False Sociology , ·  at New York Unive t" s i t y 11  1 9 8 0 .  
2. Michael Ryan, ·Mi l i tant Documentaty: Hai-68 P a r  Lui , ·  i n  
Cine-tracts, no. ? / 8 .  On pages 1 8 - 1 9  Ryan vrites 
What Mai 68 demonstrates is that even 'natural ' 
life ia highly technological, conventional and inati­
tuional. Ita content and for� is detetmined by the 
technology of langua�e and symbolic representation. 
The so-called natural vorld of Hai 68 is as •uch a 
c o nstruct as any fict ional object . 
For example, the various actions o f  the 
d i fferent groups involved in the events 
vorke rs, students,  police, union hacks, e t c .  -- all 
fall beck upon vhat can be called a ' scenari o . ' that 
ts hi�hly over-determined set of cenacious and 
uncoTl8cious prescriptions, inscribed in language , 
1DOdes of behaviour, forms of though t, role 
models, clothtng, moral codes, e tc . ,  vhich give rise 
t o  and mark out the limits of vhat happened and vhat 
vould have happened in May 1 9 6 8 .  There was an 
unvritten rule that the students vould not use 
arms . Li�evise, the vorkera could not stot"Vl the 
National Assembly. Otherv1ee, the rule forbiddin� the 
police from 1111>ving them all dovn vould have been 
legitimately forgotten. The homes of the bourgeoise 
vere not to be broken into. The battle was to be 
li•ited t o  the streets and the factorie s ,  the pre­
scribed scenes of revolution. The city was not 
t o  be aet on fire • • • •  
Limita on action are detetmined by, among other 
things, role-giving concepts. The concept ( i n  con­
junction vith the reality) ·police� determine& the 
behaviour of the men hired to carry out that 
epithet • • •  , 
The role of 'fict ional ' con11tructa i n  deter­
•ining 'real ' history ia most clear in tet'llle of 
tnetitutions and of lacwuage • • • •  
the events of Hai 68 then, even i f  they can, 
a l a  li-1te, be called a real referent, are theruelvee 
co nstituted as a play of representations. T1hey are 
real, but not 'natural ' and uncontrived. Rietory, but 
a history which i a  constructed. At the limit of non­
fict ion i a  another fonn o f  fiction,  just as the goal 
or limit of fiction (in film} i s  a seemingly non­
fict ionalized event • • • •  
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My point, then, i s  that the presence o f  real 
histoI� and objective fact vhich docunientary sup­
posedly renders is itaelf cOt1priaed of and constituted 
by repreaentat1ons . Fictional representation is ehovn 
to be histot'ica l .  Thie would be the geature of 
reducin� f i c t ional f i l m  to documentary. It is the 
Marxi s t  ideology-critical m>ment of the analya i s .  The 
decoNitructive equivalent of this moment i s  to show 
that the supposedly natural referent of non-fictional 
fil� c.an be i t s e l f  described as a kind of f i c t i o n .  a 
complex aet of preaentations -- political,  aocial , 
i mt itutional, conceptua 1 1  phy s i c a l ,  11 nguistic 
vhose reference one to the other in history is open­
ende d. -
3. Christian Ket�, •the Iaaginary S i g n 1 f i e r , ·  Screen, V o l .  1 6 ,  
No. 2 ,  summer 1 9 7 5 .  On page 4 7 ,  he w r ites -At t he theater 
Sarah Bernhardt may t e l l  me she is Phedre or if the play 
were from another period and rejected the figurative 
regi11te, she might s a y ,  as in a type of lllOdern theater, that 
she is Sarah Bernhardt. But at any rate, 1 should see 
Sarah Bernhard t .  At the cinema she could make two kinds of 
speeches too, but it would be her shadow that would be 
offering them to me (or she would be offering them in her 
ovn absence ) .  Evet-y f i l m  is a fict ion f i l m." 
4.  Richard Keran Barsam attributes t h i s  view t o  Andrew Sarris 
in Nonfiction Film: A Critical History (New York: E . P .  
Dutton and C o .  1 1 9 7 3 ) .  
5 .  Michael Ryan, ·"Hili tant Documentar y . "  
Derri d a t s  conc�?t of d i fferance holds that two polar 
opposites when examined closely, deconstructed, reveal 
traces of each other such that the dichotomy collapses as 
the terms become each other (or inanifest el,ements of each 
other). Thie is a function of the common 01rigin of the 
te t'11ls.  In Of Grammatology, Derrida writes ·This cocl'tOn 
r o o t ,  which is not a root but the concealment of the origin 
and which ie not couuDon because it does not amount to the 
same thing except with the unmonotonous insistence of 
d i f ference, this unnatneable 11110vement of d i f f erence- i t s e l f ,  
that l have strategically nicknamed trace, reserve or 
d i f f�rance , could be called w r i t i n g  only within the his­
torical closure, that is to say within the limits of 
sci ence and philosophy . •  Jacques Derrida, Of Gra111ft&t o l ogy, 
t r a ns. Gayati Chakravorty Spivak (Balti1110re: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1 9 7 4 ) ,  p . 9 3 .  In Positions , Derrida 
defines d i fferance as "a s t ructure and a movement which 
cannot be conceived on the basis of the opposition presence/ 
absence. Differance is the systematic play of d i f f erences, 
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of the spa cing (eepace.ent ) by vhich element& refer 
to one another.·  Ryan vents to uae this concept and 
t h e  metbod of deconttruction to ahow that fiction 
fil•a blur into nonfiction and vice-versa. See the 
laat paragraph of note 2 .  
6 .  See Grierson on Documentary, edited by 
(London! Faber ao.d Faber, 1979).  
Forayth Hardy 
7 .  D�iga Vertov, ·selected Writings , ·  in Avant-�arde F i lm, 
edited by P .  Ada .. S itney (New York: N ev  York Unive rsity 
Preaa, 1 9 7 8 ) .  Oo pa�e 5, Vertov vritea i1y road ta toward 
the creation of a fresh perception of the vorld. Thua, l 
decipher in a new vay the world unknovn to you.· 
8 .  Frederick Wise.aa , an interview i n  The Nev Documentary in 
Action, by Alan Rosenthal (Berkeley: University of 
California Preas, 1 9 7 7 ) ,  p .  70. 
9 .  Erik Barnouw, Documentary (New Yor�: Oxford University 
Preas, 1974), pp. 287-288. 
1 0 .  See for example Peter Graham, "Cine.a Verite in Prance , 
Film Quarterly, 17 ( SwinEr ,  1 9 6 4 ) ;  Colin Young, ·cineraa of 
Common Sense,· Film Quarterly 17 (Suwr, 1964);  Young, 
·observational Cine.,.· i n  Principles of V i s u a l  Anthropology, 
edited by Paul Hocki nga (The Hague: Mouton Publi a hers, 
1 9 7 5 ) .  l n  theae articles the authors, though arguing that 
film ta neoeaaarily subjective, do not turn this into a 
rejecti,on of the prospects of docu.entary filmmaking. 
1 1 .  Bela Balazs, Theory of Film (New York: Dover Publications, 
1970),  pp. 89-90 . 
1 2 .  Lucien Goldman, ·cine11fl and Sociolog y , •  i n  Anthropol ogy 
-Reality -- Cinema, edited my Hick Eaton (London: British 
Film Inatitute, 1 9 7 9 ) ,  p. 64. 
13. A aomevhat shailar, thou"h not identica 1, concept of 
indexing is used in regard to artworks in "Piece: Contra 
Aesthetica• by Ti1a0thy Binkley in Philosophy Looks at the 
Arts, edited by Joseph Margolis {Philadelphia: Temple 
untVers ity Preea, 1978).  
1 4 .  The idea of segments of posstble worlds derives from 
Nicholas Wolteratorff, ��orlds of Works of Art , - Journal 
of Aesthetica and Art Criticism XXXV ( 1 9 7 6 ) .  
1 5 .  I recoamend that film theorists uae a narrower sense of 
ideology than they presently use. I would call an asser­
t ion -- like ·rhose vho are unemployed have only their own 
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laziness to blaPe for tbeir proble .... � ideological vhen 
I )  ia false and 2 )  ie uaed to support &08E! relation of 
social do•ination or oppre.sion. Pil• theorists, of course. 
also vant to describe entire •Yllbol .syste8E! � like cinema 
or JanguaJ{e - as ideological. Such aysteu are not true 
or false. But if an entire symbol syste• could be charac­
terixed as ideolOgica l ,  I think it •ould be because it l )  
excludes or represses the representation of certain social 
facts or relatioas ar.cl 2) is used to support social oppres­
sion in virtue of the exclusions i t  entails. 
So.e Mat"Xists have also disapproved of the globel con­
cept of ideol�y used by fil• theori s t s .  In their criti­
cisftS of the Althusserian tendencies of Screen, '-evin 
McDonnell and Xevin Robins vt"ite that ideology should 
becoee ·a. less total phena.enon than it is for Althus­
serians vho identify ft with the cultural or syabolic as a 
whole. We take ideology to be an abstract concept, re­
ferring only to the fetishised f oras assumed by thought 
which uncri tically confronts the necessaty constrainls of 
capitalist sodal reality • • • •  • in 9Marxist Cultural Theory· 
in One Dimensional Marxism (London: Allison and Busby 
Limited, 1980), p. 1 6 7 .  Though l disagree vith much of 
McDonnel l and kobins ' s  position, I think their cons ter­
nation vith the rei�ing, inflated idea of ideology ls 
correct. 
Since the c011pletion of this essay I have discovered 
.another voice raised against the bloated concept of ideo­
logy used by film "heorists - Terry Lovell, Pictures of 
Reality (Londo�: British Film Institute, 1 9 80). Like 
McDonnell and Robins, Love l l  is a Marxist who is a��acking 
the Althusserian mandarins of British film theory 
apparently a s�ort of gaining popularity in England. 
Lovel l ' s  bo<* is a mixed blessing. The account of trends 
in philosophy of science is not only turgid and ques­
tionably me�aphoric but inept and riddled vith error. for 
exa�ple, the definition of induction offered o n  page 1 1  is 
philosophically incorrect. On the other hand , Lovell has 
some salutary things to say about ideology. Lovel l argues 
that ideology M1'8y be' defined as the production and dis­
semination of erroneous beliefs whose inadequacies are 
soci.ally �tivated . ..  (page 5 1 )  Lovell also provides a 
useful sel"Vice by showing that this conception of ideology 
dictates the f onn that ideological analysis should take. 
one which is reflected in Mane's method. "To establish 
that a given body of ideas or theory serve class interests 
is always insufficient to justify the label ideol�y. It 
i s  al�ays necessary first to apply episte�ological criteria 
to naluate the· work • •  ' . .  Th·e common practice o'f discredit­
ing ideas by ref�rence to their social origin .1e not what 
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i e  •ant by thia cri t i q ue .  Questions of validity are a l ­
ways involved . V e  can learn a good deal here fr Oll Marx 's 
ovn pract ice. H i e  pro�dure ie to first of all establish bv 
theoretical acalyeia, argu•nt aod evidence, an account of 
whate-.-er ie in conten tion. He then �oee on to ehov pre­
cieely in vhich reapecte a rival theory f alle short of ex­
planatory power. Only then does he attempt to relate those 
epec1f ic error• to cbee aUgn�nte and the class e t  ruggle. 
An e�ample of this •thod is to be found in Vol. I l l  of 
Capital where h e  conaidere the evidence given by bankens in 
the lleport of the Comld.ttee on Bank Acts of 1857. He aeses-
8ett this eviden� in terms of i t e  internal incons istencies, 
and its theoretical aod eepirical inadequacies. He then 
goea on to argue that these view& are to be e�pected frogi 
bankers vtthin that structure of social relatio� because 
of the for• which social relations take in general under 
capitalism, and because of the particular position of 
bankers within that structure of social relat ion• and the 
interests vhich that poei�ion generates . Hia argu�nt i e ,  
i n  effect, 'thia t a  indeed how W>ney aod banking would ap­
pear to people 110 situated, and these are the categories 
they would require in their day-to-day conduct of their 
business activities • • • •  ' Thie procedure ta exe•plat�, but 
is seldom followed by people wishing to egplore the ideolo­
gical under�inninge of their opponents' though t s . ·  Hope­
fully this invoca tion of the ..aster v i l l  shame Ctn� 
Manista into adopt111$!; a aaore ri�oroua approach to the an­
alysis of ideology than the guilt-by-association (usually 
free association) tactics that are ao prevalent nowadays . 
I n  ., ovn vritiage I have eometi•a used a looeer, 
Leninist concept of ideology in which ·1deologica1• t a  
interchangeable vith ·poUtica l . ..  Thie i a a n  acce.p table, 
ca11mon uea�e. Under this variant, a Man1at might a.peak of 
•the c ommunist ideology.· Neverthele s s ,  I think that the 
aenae of ideology outlined in the preceding paragraphs ia 
the eoat f\lnda.ental and correct. It is probably beat to 
keep t he  critical edge to the concept. One should, there­
fore, announce that one i s  ueiftg the Leninist concept vhen 
one adopt• i t  in an acalya t a .  
16.  Monroe C .  Beardsley, The P08e i  bili ty of Criticta• (Detroi t :  
Wayne State University Preas, 1970).  
1 7 .  In Realia• and t h e  Cinema. edited by Christopher Williams 
(London: Routledge and IC.egan Paul, 1980), p. 226. 
1 8 .  See especially vol. I of Andr' Baz in'a What le Cine.a? 
t ranslated and edited by Rugh Cray (Berkeley: University of 
California Preea, 1967).  
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1 9 .  •the World Viewed , �  Georgia Re•iev, Winter 1 9 7 4 .  
2 0 .  According to £ric Rhode tn ·why Neo-Realiam Failled , �  
Sight and Sound, 30,  (Winter 1960/61 }. 
2 1 .  Monroe c. Beards l e y ,  Aesthetics (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and World, 1958),  especially Chapter V I ,  section 1 6 .  Also 
aee GOran Herwer�n, llepreaentation and Meaning in the 
Visual Arts (Lund: Scandinavian University Books , 1969) es­
pecially Chapter I I .  
22. Op. c i t .  
23. In Cine11a Verit� i n  America (Bostu,1: KIT Preas, 1974),  
Stephen l'ta•ber writes ·cinema •erite adopts Renoi r ' s  idea 
of the camera and uses it as a recording t o o l ,  so that the 
events themaelves ,  'the knowledge of man. 1 be come the 
standard we use to judae the fil•.- (p. 1 8 ) .  
2 4 .  Stephen Heath, Questions of Cinema (Bloo111in1gton: Indiana 
University Preas, 1 9 8 1 ), pp. 237-238. 
2�. For analysis and criticism of the concept of auture, see 
Noel Carroll, -Address to the Heathen, · October, 1 2 1 ,  
Winter 1 9 8 2 ,  aections IV a nd  V I .  
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